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Abstract
Climate change litigation is a viable tool in the fight against climate change. For the past 2 decades,
climate litigation has largely been based on torts and administrative law. However, courts have
recently been quite receptive to human rights arguments in climate cases, thereby necessitating
recognition of the human rights approach as an important facet of climate litigation. It is important
for intergenerational equity to be integrated into the human rights approach to climate change. One
of the major benefits of intergenerational equity to the human rights approach is its potential to
catalyze the recognition of the right to a healthy environment. The conclusion in this thesis is that
the right to a healthy environment and intergenerational equity are two vital components of the
human rights approach to climate change and are necessary to advance the human rights approach
to climate litigation.
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Chapter One: Introduction
1.1. Background
This research evaluates the human rights approach to climate change vis-à-vis litigation and
determines the extent to which the approach embodies the concept of intergenerational equity. The
thesis examines theoretical issues in the human rights and intergenerational perspectives to climate
change and how these issues translate to practical challenges for the human rights approach to
climate litigation.
Climate litigation is important because it is viewed as a tool, not just to compel climate
action, but also to influence policy outcomes, corporate behaviour and public opinion.1 Climate
litigation in a very broad sense is litigation aimed at achieving the three components of climate
action2 – mitigation, adaptation, and compensation for climate-associated loss and damage.3 The
claims in climate lawsuits are framed in different ways including claims for damages in torts,
injunctions against climate-unfriendly activities, judicial review of climate-unfriendly acts or
omissions by States, disclosure of climate risks, reckoning climate risks in investments, and
violation of fundamental human rights. These cases are mostly instituted by individuals and
advocacy groups before domestic, regional and international courts and tribunals, and are typically
brought against governments as well as private corporations. Climate litigation has largely been
based on torts and administrative law i.e. statutory law regulating governments’ decision-making
processes affecting climate change.4 However, courts have recently been quite receptive to human

1

J Setzer & R Byrnes, Global trends in climate change litigation: 2019 snapshot (London: Grantham Research
Institute on Climate Change and the Environment and Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy, London
School of Economics and Political Science, 2019) at 1 [Setzer & Byrnes].
2
See SDG Goal 13 for meaning of climate action in Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development, UNGAOR, 70th Sess, UN Doc A/RES/70/1 (2015) at p 14, [UNSDGs].
3
Setzer & Byrnes, supra note 1 at 2.
4
Jacqueline Peel & Hari M Osofsky, “A Rights Turn in Climate Change Litigation?” (2018) 7:1 Transnational
Environmental Law 37 at 39 [Peel & Osofsky].

1

rights arguments in climate cases, which has led to the need for identification of the human rights
approach as a new trajectory of climate litigation which some have termed a “rights turn in climate
litigation”5 i.e. rights-based climate litigation. These rights-based climate lawsuits involve the
framing of climate-unfriendly acts and omissions as violations of fundamental human rights such
as the right to a healthy environment, the right to life, the right to health, the rights to selfdetermination, the rights of indigenous and minority groups, and the rights of future generations.6
A focal point of the discussion on the human rights approach is the recognition of the right
to a healthy environment, which is also the focus of this thesis. In the following pages, this thesis
will explore the relevance of the right to a healthy environment in the human rights approach to
climate change litigation. This thesis also critiques the rights-based approach to climate ligation
and examines how the approach can be used to protect the rights of future generations.
Incorporating intergenerational elements could also have positive effect on the rights-based
approach by enhancing rights-based arguments. The research notes that in spite of the importance
of the rights of future generations to a healthy environment, intergenerational arguments are either
included peripherally or not included at all as part of the arguments put forward in these rightsbased cases. The research therefore posits that the rights-based approach in climate litigation
presents an excellent opportunity for the rights of future generations to become part of the climate
litigation jurisprudence.
It is important to note that rights-based climate cases essentially face the same setbacks as
those faced by the conventional forms of climate litigation such as difficulty in proving causation,
remoteness of damage, standing, and justiciability.7 Rights-based climate cases may face

5

Ibid.
Ibid.
7
United Nations Environment Programme, The Status of Climate Change Litigation – A Global Review, (Kenya:
UNEP, 2017).
6

2

additional obstacles such as the lack of the right to a healthy environment, or a restrictive
interpretation of the right to a healthy environment which would reject the link between climate
change and human rights violations and would exclude climate rights, as well as the absence of
laws recognizing intergenerational climate rights. This thesis examines the extent to which rightsbased climate cases have been plagued by these challenges and how the right to a healthy
environment and the rights of future generations could address some of these challenges.
This thesis undertakes a case by case analysis of select rights-based climate cases that have
already been decided by the court with a view to determining the extent to which the courts
recognize the right to a healthy environment as well as the rights of future generations.
Another relevant issue is the possibility of employing the human rights approach to climate
litigation to hold private actors accountable for climate change. The rights approach to climate
litigation has been largely limited to enforcing the role of government in tackling climate change,
since the role of government is usually permissive rather than being actively involved i.e. by
allowing private corporations to operate in a manner inimical to the climate system. The research
explores ways of addressing this, one of which is the possibility of initiating human rights climate
lawsuits against private actors directly responsible for GHG emissions.
The research is propelled by views that the human rights approach to climate change can
address intergenerational injustices of climate change by incorporating an enhanced consideration
of the needs of future generations. The research is also driven by the recent wave of climate cases
by children and young persons in form of lawsuits, petitions and complaints being filed against
several governments across the globe. This movement is significant because children and young
persons are key actors in climate litigation and are the bridge between the present and future
generations. This is very much reflective of suggestions by the United Nations that children and

3

young persons play an active role in the fight against climate change,8 since they are the ones who
will inherit the responsibility to protect the planet, while fighting the complex scientific problems
and social quandaries presented by climate change.9

1.2. Literature Review
Climate change litigation scholars have identified a new trajectory in climate change
litigation – the human rights trajectory. Peel & Osofsky identify two ways in which rights-based
climate lawsuits have informed favourable judicial decisions on the subject. 10 The first is the
recognition of human right violation related to climate change as a cause of action in its own right,
while the second way is the use of human rights as an interpretative tool for determining whether
defendants are in breach of certain statutory obligation imposed on them.11
Scholars have identified the role of human rights law in addressing climate change and the
potentials of a rights-based approach to climate change from various perspectives. 12 Gaps
identified by climate litigation scholars in existing literature include the absence of
interdisciplinary literature on climate change litigation and the selection bias in favour of the more
high profile cases against the seemingly mundane “everyday” lawsuits which do not get as much
attention as the former i.e. the neglect of seemingly ordinary litigation cases and the preoccupation
with popular high-profile cases by climate litigation scholars.13

8

United Nations, “Young people should have active role in combating climate change – Ban”, UN News (12 August
2008), online: <news.un.org/en/story/2008/08/269182-young-people-should-have-active-role-combating-climatechange-ban>.
9
Harshal T. Pandve et al, “Role of youth in combating climate change” (2009) 13:2 Indian J Occupational &
Environmental Medicine 105, online: <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2847326/>.
10
Peel & Osofsky, supra note 4.
11
Ibid.
12
Bridget Lewis, “Human Rights Duties Towards Future Generations and the Potential for Achieving Climate Justice”
(2016) 34:3 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 206 at 207 [Bridget Lewis, “Human Rights Duties”].
13
Joana Setzer & Lisa C Vanhala, “Climate change litigation: A review of research on courts and litigants in climate
governance” (2019) 10:3 WIREs Clim Change 1, online: <https://doi.org/10.1002/wcc.580> [Setzer & Vanhala].

4

There is a lot of scholarship on the human rights approach to climate litigation. However,
there are scant references to intergenerational elements in rights-based climate litigation i.e.
scholarship that approaches intergenerational rights from a litigation perspective vis-à-vis the
rights-based approach. There is very little work done on the relationship between the human rights
approach and intergenerational equity. This forms part of what I perceive to be a gap in existing
scholarship.

1.3. Research Methodology
This thesis employs a number of research methodologies, the foremost being doctrinal
research. According to Hutchinson & Duncan, doctrinal research “…provides a systematic
exposition of the rules governing a particular legal category, analyses the relationship between
rules, explains areas of difficulty and, perhaps, predicts future developments.”14 The research
undertaken in this thesis is largely doctrinal as it will involve the analysis of laws, treaties,
customary international law,15 judicial decisions and opinions, court processes, law texts, reports
of international/government organisations, and opinions of legal scholars, and other relevant
sources. In addition to treaties and customary international law, this thesis relies extensively on

14

Terry Hutchinson & Nigel Duncan, “Defining and Describing What We Do: Doctrinal Legal Research.” (2012)
17:1 Deakin L Rev 83 at 101, online: <https://ojs.deakin.edu.au/index.php/dlr/article/view/70>.
15
Customary international law “consists of rules of law derived from the consistent conduct of States acting out of the
belief that the law required them to act that way.” See Shabtai Rosenne, Practice and Methods of International Law
(New York: Oceana Publications, 1984) at p 55. The elements of Customary international are “(1) widespread
repetition by States of similar international acts over time (State practice); (2) the requirement that the acts must occur
out of a sense of obligation (opinio juris); and (3) that the acts are taken by a significant number of States and not
rejected by a significant number of States.” See Marci Hoffman & Mary Rumsey, ‘International and Foreign Legal
Research: A Coursebook (Leiden; Boston : Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2007) at p 112. There are certain general
principles of international environmental law that have arguably attained the status of customary international law and
could be applicable to protection of the environment. Such principles include prevention, no-harm principle, polluter
pays principle, precautionary principle. See Max Valverde Soto, "General Principles of International Environmental
Law" (1996) 3:1 ILSA J Intl & Comp L 193.

5

several resolutions of the United Nations (UN) especially the UN General Assembly and the UN
Human Rights Council.16
The research draws on climate lawsuits involving human rights and intergenerational
arguments to determine how these cases have advanced the human rights approach to climate
litigation.
An important aspect of the doctrinal research is that it attempts, as much as possible, to
expand its focus beyond the high-profile cases to include the routine cases. A focus on high-profile
cases without examining other cases creates the impression that rights-based climate lawsuits have
had overwhelming acceptance in court, whereas the uncelebrated cases, which constitute a
significant majority of rights-based climate cases, have not been accepted in courts overall.17
The thesis also involves some form of empirical research as I employ content analysis in
arriving at some of the conclusions in this thesis. According to Hall & Wright, content analysis
involves selecting cases, coding cases and analyzing the coded information.18 Content analysis is
used to determine the extent to which rights-based arguments in climate litigation have been
accepted by courts, the proportion of cases in which the courts recognise the right to a healthy
environment and the rights of future generations. The cases analysed in this thesis are cases in

16

These resolutions generally do not have binding effects on UN member states but “are regarded as recommendations
to member states of the UN.” See Stephen M Schwebel, “The Effect of Resolutions of the U.N. General Assembly on
Customary International Law’, (1979) 73 Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law)
301 at 306; Marko Divac Öberg, “The Legal Effects of Resolutions of the UN Security Council and General Assembly
in the Jurisprudence of the ICJ”, (2005) 16:5 European J of International L, 879; See also decision of the International
Court of Justice – South West Africa (Ethiopia v S Africa; Liberia v S Africa) (Second Phase) [1966] ICJ Rep 6 at 50–
51, para 98. The resolutions are however useful as they could crystallize certain customary international law principles
and could also impact treaty making process as they often times are preliminary steps towards negotiation of treaties.
See Christopher Greenwood, “Sources of International Law: An Introduction”, (United Nations Audiovisual Library
Lecture Series, delivered in 2008) online: United Nations <http://webtv.un.org/watch/judge-greenwood-icj-on-thesources-of-international-law/2622924798001/?term=&lan=english>.
17
Annalisa Savaresi & Juan Auz, “Climate Change Litigation and Human Rights: Pushing the Boundaries” (2019)
9:3 Climate Law, online (pdf): <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3374730>, [Savaresi & Auz].
18
Mark A Hall and Ronald F Wright, “Systematic Content Analysis of Judicial Opinions” (2008) 96 Calif L Rev 63
at 79.

6

which human rights and/or intergenerational arguments are used by plaintiffs as the basis for
compelling climate action such as measures for the reduction of GHG emissions.19 Due to the
global nature of the intergenerational climate rights movement, lawsuits are instituted in several
jurisdictions, and in some instances with the causes of action crisscrossing jurisdictions. Therefore,
cases analysed over the course of this research were drawn from different jurisdictions, rather than
from a specific country, region or adjudicatory body.
An underlying theoretical assumption in this thesis is that litigation can influence social
change and therefore falls within the sphere of law and social change theory which postulates that
law influences social change.20 Law as a tool of social engineering involves the use of “any type
of process by which individual or collective actors invoke legal norms, discourse or symbols to
influence policy or behaviour”21 i.e. the “use of the law and legal techniques as an instrument for
obtaining wider collective objectives.”22 In this thesis, litigation is understood as a tool which can
drive climate action and the ideas in this thesis proceed on that assumption.
The thesis also discusses human rights theories in an attempt to seek theoretical justification
for the human rights approach to climate change and more specifically the right to a healthy
environment. John Rawls’ theory of justice is also relevant theory to this research.23 The Rawlsian
theory of justice highlights the injustice occasioned by climate change. Another relevant theory in
this thesis is the theory of intergenerational equity which highlights the need for recognition of the

19

Although the framing of cases to render elements of climate change invisible (what Bouwer refers to as “inadvertent”
climate change litigation) have been criticized by some scholars, these cases are still very much worth considering as
far as the rights-based approach and the entire climate change litigation jurisprudence are concerned. See Kim Bouwer,
“The Unsexy Future of Climate Change Litigation”, (2018) 30:3 J of Environmental L 483 [Bouwer].
20
C Harlow & R Rawlings, Pressure through law (London: Routledge, 1992).
21
Lisa Vanhala & Jacqui Kinghan, “Literature Review on the Use and Impact of Litigation” (2018) Lankelly
Chase/Public
Law
Project
Research
Paper
at
5,
online:
<publiclawproject.org.uk/wpcontent/uploads/2018/04/Literature-Review.pdf> [Vanhala & Kinghan]
22
C Harlow & R Rawlings, Pressure through law (London: Routledge, 1992).
23
See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, revised ed (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999) at 15 [Rawls’
Theory].
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rights of future generations. The feminist theory of relational autonomy is also a key theory
discussed in this thesis.

1.4. What is a Human Rights Approach to Climate Change?
Human rights are rights essential to all human beings, without discrimination on ground of
race, colour, ethnicity, nationality, sex, language, religion, birth or any other status.24 Human rights
include the right to life and liberty, the right to property, freedom from discrimination, freedom of
opinion and expression, the right to work and education, and many more.25 The creation and
enforcement of these rights are governed by human rights law. Human rights law operates at the
international level as well as at the domestic level of individual states. At the international level,
“human rights are often expressed and guaranteed by law, in the forms of treaties, customary
international law, general principles and other sources of international law.”26 Human rights are
understood within the context of international human rights law to be “universal, interdependent
and interrelated”27 meaning that all human rights are the same across the globe, they are of equal
importance and dependent on one another since “none can be fully enjoyed without the others.”28
International human rights law sets out obligations of States to act in a certain manner and the
obligation not to undertake certain actions in order to respect, protect and fulfil the fundamental

24

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 217A (III), UNGAOR, 3rd Sess, Supp No 13, UN Doc A/810 (1948) articles
2 & 3, online: <https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3712c.html> [UDHR]; United Nations, Human Rights: “What
are Human Rights?”, online: <https://www.un.org/en/sections/issues-depth/human-rights/>, [UN, “What are Human
Rights?”].
25
UN, “What are Human Rights?”, ibid.
26
OHCHR, “What are Human Rights?”, online: <https://www.ohchr.org/en/issues/pages/whatarehumanrights.aspx>
[OHCHR, “What are Human Rights?”].
27
UN General Assembly, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, 12 July 1993, A/CONF.157/23, (12 July
1993), para 5.
28
UNFPA, “Human Right Principles”, 2005, online: < https://www.unfpa.org/resources/human-rights-principles>;
Priscila Neves-Silva, Giselle Isabele Martins & Léo Heller, “Human rights’ interdependence and indivisibility: a
glance over the human rights to water and sanitation”, (2019) 19:4 BMC International Health and Human Rights at
2.
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human rights of its citizens.29 At the domestic level, the sources of human rights law include
statutes, regional and international law instruments. States are obligated to “refrain from
interfering with or curtailing the enjoyment of human right… and to protect individuals and groups
against human rights abuses.”30 Failure by a State to adhere to these obligations often gives rise to
a cause of action against the State by its citizens as well as other affected States.
A human rights-based approach is “a conceptual framework that is normatively based on
international human rights standards and operationally directed to promoting and protecting human
rights.”31 The purpose of the approach is to analyze obligations, inequalities and vulnerabilities
and to redress discriminatory practices and unjust distributions of power that impede progress and
undercut human rights.32 Within the human rights-based approach, plans, “policies and
programmes are anchored in a system of rights and corresponding obligations established by
international law.”33 This approach promotes sustainability and empowers people entitled to the
rights (“right-holders”), particularly those who are the most vulnerable, to partake in policymaking and hold responsible those who have an obligation to protect human rights (“duty-bearers”
e.g. States and private entities).34 The essential attributes of a human rights-based approach include
the following as essential objectives – fulfilling human rights; identifying rights-holders, their
entitlements, and corresponding duty-bearers and their obligations; striving to strengthen the
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capacities of rights-holders to assert their claims and of duty-bearers to meet their obligations; and
should be guided by principles and standards derived from international human rights treaties.35
According to UNICEF, the human rights approach embodies the following principles –
“universality & inalienability, indivisibility, interdependence & inter-relatedness, equality & nondiscrimination, participation & inclusion, and accountability and rule of law.”36 These principles
are also reflected in the principles of the European Network of National Human Rights Institutions
(ENNHRI),37 which are participation,38 accountability,39 non-discrimination & equality,40
empowerment41 and legality42 (PANEL).43 The human-rights based approach and principles
outlined above have been adopted globally and domestically in a number of initiatives in relation
to education,44 development,45 social protection,46 poverty,47 conservation,48 among many other
areas.
With regard to protection of the environment generally, the human rights approach has
been employed in three ways: (1) the greening of existing human rights – imbuing existing human
rights such as rights to life, health, dignity with environmental rights dimensions (as opposed to
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creating separate environmental rights); (2) ensuring procedural guarantees enabling affected
citizens to participate in decision-making respecting their environment;49 (3) the creation of
substantive environmental rights distinct from existing human rights.50 There is an unending
debate as to whether environmental rights should be “greened” or whether a distinct environmental
right should be created,51 but the view taken in this thesis is the latter.
Within the climate context, a human rights approach to climate change therefore
determines the human rights and obligations related to climate change, how climate change
impedes human rights, and how human rights violations can be redressed. The questions arising
from the human rights approach with regard to the greening of existing human rights, the creation
of substantive environmental rights and procedural guarantees are still relevant to the climate
change discourse.
According to the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR),
climate change has a major impact on a wide range of human rights, and could have a cataclysmic
impact in the future unless ambitious actions are undertaken immediately. The OHCHR notes that
there is an intrinsic link between climate change and the realization of a range of fundamental
human rights.52 The human rights being threatened and violated by climate change include the
rights to life, health, food, water and sanitation, a healthy environment, an adequate standard of
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living, housing, property, self-determination, development and culture.53 Climate change also
exacerbates poverty and equality in poor countries and populations.54

1.5. The Meaning of Intergenerational Equity
According to the principle of intergenerational equity, the present generation inherits the
planet from past generations for their benefit, to hold for and to bequeath to future generations in
a condition of no less quality than they themselves inherited. The principle embodies an
understanding that “the present generation holds natural resources in trust for future generations”55
and must ensure the quality and availability of natural resources for the future generations.56 Weis
puts it thus:
We, the human species, hold the natural environment of our planet in common with all
members of our species: past generations, the present generation, and future generations.
As members of the present generation, we hold the earth in trust for future generations. At
the same time, we are beneficiaries entitled to use and benefit from it.”57
Human society is characterised as a partnership between past, present and future
generations.58 Intergenerational equity posits that present generations are under an obligation to
maintain the planet, leave it in the same or no worse condition than they received it, and ensure
that posterity has equitable access to the planet’s resources.59 Each generation has a responsibility
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to bequeath a planet of no less quality than they themselves inherited as the future generations
“would want to inherit the common patrimony of the planet in as good condition as it has been for
any previous generation, and to have as good access to it as previous.”60 Since intergenerational
equity places on the present generation a minimum obligation of not leaving the planet in a
condition worse off than they received it, it invariably means that the planet should be bequeathed
in either the same condition or in a better condition than it was received.61
It is important to note that there are two capacities in which the present generation holds
the planet – as beneficiaries and as custodians. In their capacity as beneficiaries, the present
generation has the right to enjoy the planet, and therefore can enforce this right amongst
themselves.62 In their capacity as custodians, members of the present generation act as a check to
one another in ensuring that the planet is handed over to future generations in no worse condition
than it was received. This raises a question as to what it means to leave the planet in no worse
condition or in a better shape. An argument could be made that the numerous developments made
overtime – especially technological ones – have improved the conditions of life on the planet and
should therefore be considered in determining whether the planet has been improved by way of a
cost-benefit analysis.63
Intergenerational equity is one of the principles of international environmental law and is
considered as one of the foundational principles for the concept of sustainable development.64
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1.6. Climate Change and Future Generations
Article 2.1 of the Paris Agreement seeks to limit global warming by “[h]olding the increase
in the global average temperature to well below 2℃ above pre-industrial levels and to pursue
efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5℃ above pre-industrial levels, recognising that this
would significantly reduce the risks and impacts of climate change [emphasis supplied]” 65. In a
2018 report, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)66 analysed the emissions in
the pre-industrial era and came to the conclusion that this target under the Paris Agreement
translates to limiting global warming to a temperature of 1.5°C.67 The IPCC projects that “[g]lobal
warming is likely to reach 1.5°C between 2030 and 2052 if it continues to increase at the current
rate” unless there is drastic reduction in GHG emissions by 45% from 2010 levels by 2030, and
net zero emissions by 2050.68 It therefore follows that a safe climate would be one which at the
very least maintains a global temperature of less than 1.5°C. For intergenerational equity, this
means that merely handing over the planet under 1.5°C does not suffice. The present generation is
saddled with the responsibility of not only ensuring that future generations do not inherit a planet
with a temperature of up to 1.5°C, but ensuring that there is a clear pathway laid down for
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succeeding generations to follow in order to guarantee the continuous maintenance of the global
temperature and to keep the responsibility cycle going.
Within the climate change regime, several scientific studies have been carried out to
determine the impacts of climate change on future generations. The intergenerational implication
of climate change is grounded by scientific studies which reveal that the effect of global warming
will last for centuries and millennia. According to the IPCC, “global warming from anthropogenic
emissions from the pre-industrial period to the present will persist for centuries to millennia and
will continue to cause further long-term changes in the climate system, such as sea level rise, with
associated impacts.”69 The IPCC confirms that sea level will continue to rise well beyond 2100
even if global warming is limited to 1.5°C within the 21st century.70 Other impacts include
increases in mean temperature in most land and ocean regions, hot extremes in most inhabited
regions, heavy precipitation in some regions, as well as drought and precipitation deficits in other
regions.71 It is also projected that “climate-related risks to health, livelihoods, food security, water
supply, human security, and economic growth are projected to increase with global warming of
1.5°C and increase further with [warming of] 2°C over [the next few]centuries.”72
Another scientific study indicates that “even though the majority of CO2 emitted from
burning a single tonne of coal or oil today will be absorbed over a few centuries by the oceans and
vegetation, approximately 25% of it will still be lingering in the atmosphere in 1,000 years, and
10% still remaining and impacting the climate in 100,000 years time.”73 Yet another study by a
group of 26 leading climate scientists supports this by stating that “[e]ven after emissions stop
69
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completely, atmospheric temperatures are not expected to decline much for many centuries to
millennia because of the long lifetime of CO2 in the atmosphere.”74 The study further emphasizes
the impacts on future generations:
While global warming can be stopped, it cannot easily be reversed due to the long
lifetime of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. Even a thousand years after reaching a
zero-emission society, temperatures will remain elevated, likely cooling down by only
a few tenths of a degree below their peak values. Therefore, decisions taken now have
profound and practically irreversible consequences for many generations to come,
unless affordable ways to extract CO2 from the atmosphere in massive amounts can
be found in the future. The chances of this do not appear to be promising.75
It is clear that future generations will suffer the impacts of climate change for which the
present generation is responsible. Eventually, the present generation will pass away, leaving future
generations to deal with the problem. There is, therefore, a need for intergenerational justice.

1.7. The Structure of the Thesis
This thesis is divided into seven chapter. Chapter one is the introduction. Chapter two provides an
overview of the human rights approach to climate change. Chapter three examines the relationship
between the right to a healthy environment and climate change. Chapter four discusses the concept
of intergenerational equity. Chapter five analyses each of the human rights-based climate decisions
by providing a summary of each case and identifying the right to a healthy environment and
intergenerational equity components. Chapter six examines the challenges to the human rights and
intergenerational approaches to climate litigation and how these challenges can be surmounted.
Chapter seven summarises all the discussions and recommendations in this thesis.
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Chapter Two: Understanding the Human Rights Approach to Climate Change
This chapter provides an overview of the human rights approach to tackling climate change.
The chapter examines the legal framework for the human rights approach to climate change, the
evolution of the approach, and identifies specific human rights with linkages to climate change.

2.1. An Overview of the Legal Framework for the Human Rights Approach to Climate
Change
This section provides an overview of the laws and instruments that support the human rights
approach to climate change. These laws include international human rights instruments,
international environmental law instruments, international climate law instruments, regional
human right instruments, national constitutions and other domestic laws.76 It is also pertinent to
note that these instruments are referred to in climate litigation cases that adopt a human rights
approach.77 In addition to treaties, the human rights approach draws from other sources of
international law including customary international law principles such as the prevention principle,
no-harm principle, precautionary principle, among other principles.78
The instruments in this section are analysed using a positivist state-centric approach.
However, there are alternate ways of theorizing the binding nature of international legal instrments.
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Such theories include the interactional theory,79 Third World Approaches to International Law
(TWAIL),80 and theories that consider the role of non-state actors.81

2.1.1. International Human Rights Law
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) – The UDHR is an international
instrument embodying human rights, which was ratified in 1948.82 The UDHR is generally
understood to be the foundation of international human rights law.83 It contains rights which are
affected by climate change such as the rights to life, liberty, security of the human person, health,
equality, property, among other rights. Although the UDHR was not originally intended to be a
binding instrument, some of the principles laid down therein may have attained the status of
customary international law (which is binding)84 and these principles are usually invoked by
litigants and petitioners in support of complaints against human rights violations occasioned by
climate change.85
The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) – The
ICESCR is another instrument under international human rights law that embodies human rights
79
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affected by climate change such as the right to self-determination, equality, food, health, adequate
standard of living, a means of livelihood, the utilization of natural resources, among other rights.86
The ICESCR came into force in 1976. It expounded the rights under the UDHR and is legally
binding on the 170 party states (through ratification, accession and succession).87 The ICESCR is
one of the instruments that forms the basis of the human rights approach to climate change, and
has been relied upon by litigants in human rights-based climate litigation cases.
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) – The ICCPR mandates
parties to respect the civil and political rights of individuals, such as the right to life, equality,
among other rights.88 The ICCPR came into force in 1976 and is legally binding on its 171 party
states.89 The ICCPR has been relied on by litigants in a number of human rights-based climate
litigation cases. The UDHR, the ICESCR and the ICCPR collectively constitute what is known as
“the International Bill of Human Rights.”90
The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) – The UNDRIP was
adopted by the UN General Assembly on 13 September 2007. The UNDRIP creates a “framework
of minimum standards for the survival, dignity and well-being of the indigenous peoples of the
world and it elaborates on existing human rights standards and fundamental freedoms as they apply
to the specific situation of indigenous peoples.”91 Although the UNDRIP is not expressed to be
binding, the jury is still out as to whether the UNDRIP has attained the status of customary
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international law so as to render it binding.92 The rights of indigenous people protected by the
UNDRIP include the right to life, self-determination, and so on.93 The human rights cases brought
by indigenous peoples have often relied on the UNDRIP among other instruments.
The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) – The CRC is an
instrument protecting the human rights of the child. The CRC mandates State parties to protect the
right of the child to life, family, health, and other rights.94 The CRC is legally binding on the 196
State parties who have ratified (and acceded to) it.95 The CRC has been one of the instruments
relied on in human rights-based climate litigation cases commenced by or on behalf of children.
There are several other treaties within the international human rights framework relevant to human
rights-based climate litigation such as women’s rights, rights against racial discrimination, rights
of migrant workers, rights of the disabled, among other rights.

2.1.2. International Environmental Law
The instrument discussed hereunder are non-binding documents within the framework of
international environmental law that have shaped (and are still shaping) conversations around the
human rights approach to climate change. These instruments, though not legally binding, have
formed the basis of some of the human rights litigation cases and complaints. They are important
sources of customary international environmental law principles such as the prevention principle,
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no-harm principle, precautionary principle and others.96 The concept of sustainable development
has played a vital role in “spawning” or at least “popularizing” these principles.97 The
precautionary principle in particular is very central to the concept of of sustainable development
as well as other principles of customary international law.98
The Declaration at the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment 1972
(Stockholm Declaration) – The Stockholm Declaration contains principles for “the preservation
and enhancement of the human environment.”99 Its purpose is to coordinate global efforts to
promote sustainability and safeguard the natural environment. Although the Stockholm
Declaration is not formally binding, its provisions reflect customary international law and continue
to shape future normative expectations with respect to protection of the environment.100
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development 1992 (Rio Declaration) – The Rio
Declaration is a set of principles that recognize the importance of preserving the environment and
set forth international guidelines for doing so. Just like the Stockholm Declaration, the Rio
Declaration is not formally binding but its provisions reflect principles of customary international
law and continue to shape future normative expectations with respect to protection of the
environment.101 The Rio Declaration was re-endorsed at Johannesburg in Rio +20.102
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United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) – The SDGs are the established
model for achieving a better and more sustainable future for all.103 The SDGs are aimed at tackling
“the global challenges we face, including those related to poverty, inequality, climate change,
environmental degradation, peace and justice.”104 Particularly, Goal 13 of the SDGs is to “take
urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts.”105 Goal 13 is aimed at implementing the
objectives of the UNFCCC.106 The SDGs are not binding, rather they are soft law instrument and
play an important role in the advancing the principle of sustainable development.107 Sustainable
development however is arguably a principle of customary international law, and could therefore
have some binding status.108 However, even if it is agreed that the principle has attained the status
of customary law, the fluidity and imprecision of the principle inhibits its bindingness.

2.1.3. International Climate Change Law
There are instruments within the framework of international climate change law that form
the basis of the human rights approach to climate change and have been relied on by litigants in
human-rights based climate litigation cases.109 The acts or omissions constituting human rights
violations are usually measured against the substantial provisions of these instruments, that is to
say, where acts and/or omissions of a State contravene these instruments, litigants argue that such
acts/omissions amount to human rights violations.110 The human-rights based cases typically
103
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contain arguments that States have failed to meet their international commitments towards
reducing GHG emissions, made at the 1988 International Conference on the Changing
Atmosphere, under the UNFCCC,111 the Kyoto Protocol,112 the 2009 Copenhagen Accord,113 the
2010 Cancun Agreement114 and the Paris Agreement 2015. These cases measure the acts,
omissions, laws and policies of States against the aforementioned commitments and argue that
States are in breach of these international commitments.
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) – The purpose
of the UNFCCC is to promote agreements that “stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations in the
atmosphere at a level that will prevent dangerous human interference with the climate system, in
a time frame which allows ecosystems to adapt naturally and enables sustainable development.”115
The Kyoto Protocol 1995 – The Kyoto Protocol operationalizes the UNFCCC by
committing industrialized countries to limit and reduce greenhouse gases (GHG) emissions in
accordance with agreed individual targets.116 The Protocol itself only asks those countries to adopt
policies and measures on mitigation and to report periodically. Notably, despite signing the
Protocol, the United States did not ratify it, while Canada which ratified it in 2002 withdrew from
the Protocol in 2011.117
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The Paris Agreement – This is an agreement within the UNFCCC limiting greenhouse gas
emissions, mitigation, adaptation, and loss & damage, and its long-term temperature goal is to
keep “the increase in global average temperature to well below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels;
and to pursue efforts to limit the increase to 1.5 °C, recognizing that this would substantially reduce
the risks and impacts of climate change.”118

2.1.4. Regional Instruments
There are several regional instruments that form the basis of the human rights approach to
climate change. These regional instruments include the American Convention on Human Rights
(1969),119 the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (1981),120 the European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950),121 and Protocols made
thereunder. These various instruments have been relied upon in human rights-based climate
litigation cases. In the respective regions, plaintiffs argue that acts and omissions of States adverse
to the climate system contravene the human rights guaranteed under these regional instruments.122

2.1.5. National Constitutions and Laws
Constitutions and other laws protecting human rights have formed the basis of human rightsbased climate change litigation cases. Plaintiffs typically argue that these domestic human rights
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laws as well as international human right law have been breached when laws, policies and actions
of States do not align with international climate law. The countries where the constitution and
human rights laws have been invoked in climate litigation cases include Canada, the United States,
the Netherlands, Germany, Canada, South Africa, Nigeria, Argentina, Austria, Pakistan, France,
Ireland, Colombia, Norway, Switzerland, Belgium.123

2.2. The Evolution of the Human Rights Approach to Climate Change
Human rights linkages to climate change are rooted in the discourse on the relationship
between human rights and the environment.124 It would therefore be beneficial to examine how the
relationship between human rights and the environment came to be recognised in order to better
understand the evolution of the human rights approach to climate change. The sources considered
for the purpose of examining the evolution of the human rights approach include international legal
instruments with respect to human rights, the environment, climate change, and sustainable
development, as introduced above.
The right to a healthy environment is generally considered to have first gained recognition
internationally at the UN Conference on the Human Environment, held in Stockholm in 1972
(Stockholm Declaration). Principle 1 of the Stockholm Declaration provides as follows:
Man has the fundamental right to freedom, equality and adequate conditions of life, in
an environment of a quality that permits a life of dignity and well-being, and he bears
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a solemn responsibility to protect and improve the environment for present and future
generations.
The Stockholm Declaration, although not legally binding, has nonetheless been influential in
articulating the relationship between human rights and the environment.125 Prior to the Stockholm
declaration, Switzerland was the only country to include the right to a healthy environment in its
constitution in 1971.126 It was only after the Stockholm Declaration that other States began to
incorporate the right to a healthy environment into their constitutions. Another stride in the
recognition of the right to a healthy environment was the UN’s adoption of the report by the World
Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) in 1990 declaring that “all individuals
are entitled to live in an environment adequate for their health and well-being.”127 In 1992, the
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development was convened in Rio de Janeiro in
1992, and it was there that the Rio Declaration was adopted by the UN General Assembly.
Principle 1 of the Rio Declaration states that “Human beings are at the centre of concerns for
sustainable development. They are entitled to a healthy and productive life in harmony with
nature”.128 The Rio conference of 1992 also led to the adoption of Agenda 21,129 an implementation
plan for sustainable development, which recognised the fundamental connections between the
environment and human well-being, and acknowledged the essential need to respect human rights
especially those of women and indigenous peoples, in formulating and implementing sustainable
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development practices.130 Neither the Rio Declaration nor Agenda 21 conceptualised the
environment as a human right. For this reason, it has been argued by some that both instruments
cannot be seen as progress for the environment - human rights discourse.131 However, it is worth
noting that 1992 was the peak year for the incorporation of environmental rights and
responsibilities into national constitutions, as new environmental provisions were included in 18
national constitutions in that year alone (in the Global North and Golbal South). 132
Also, one of the earliest judicial decisions acknowledging the relationship between the
environment and human rights was delivered around this period in 1993 by the Supreme Court of
the Philippines in the case of Minors Oposa v. Secretary of the Department of Environmental and
Natural Resources133 wherein it was recognised that the destruction of rain forests in the
Philippines violated the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology and the right to
self-preservation and self-perpetuation, which was enshrined in the 1987 Constitution of the
Philippines. This case also had intergenerational equity as a major component as the Court held
that the duty to protect the environment is owed not just to the present generations, but also to
future generations.
The next major step came in 1994, with the publication of the UN Draft Principles on
Human Rights and Environment, which proclaimed that “all persons have the right to a secure,
healthy and ecologically sound environment [and that] this right and other human rights, including

130

Lewis, “Human Rights and Climate Change”, supra note 125 at 80.
Ibid.
132
Boyd Paper 4, supra note 123 at 6.
133
30 July 1993, 224 Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) 792.
131

27

civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights, are universal, interdependent and
indivisible.”134 However, the principles were never adopted by the UN.135
Another instrument worth mentioning is the Johannesburg Declaration for Sustainable
Development which was endorsed by the UNGA in 2003.136 Although the Declaration does not
speak of human rights, it speaks of the connections between the environment and human wellbeing, recognising the “interdependent and mutually reinforcing pillars of sustainable
development – economic development, social development and environmental protection” and
confirming responsibility of individual states to advance and strengthen these at local, national,
regional and global levels.137
Although links were being established between human rights and the environment, there
seemed to be no linkage between human rights and climate change. The climate change dimension
of the human rights and environment conversation came into the picture in 2005 when a group of
Inuit people submitted a petition to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR)
requesting relief for human rights violations resulting from the impacts of global warming and
climate change.138 The petition specifically alleged that the United States was in violation of the
human rights of the Inuits by failing to adequately regulate GHG emissions because the emissions
had occasioned widespread environmental changes. Although the IACHR never issued a decision
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on the merits,139 the petition did succeed in drawing public attention to the severe effects of global
warming on the Inuit and sparking further dialogue about the human rights implications of climate
change.140
The second landmark in the linkage between human rights and climate change was in
November 2007 when the Small Island Developing States (SIDS) adopted the Male’ Declaration
on the Human Dimension of Global Climate Change, which was the first international agreement
to explicitly recognize that “climate change has clear and immediate implications for the full
enjoyment of human rights.”141 The Male Declaration also called upon the Conference of the
Parties (COP) to the UNFCCC and the UN human rights bodies to launch a collaborative process
for assessing the human rights implications of climate change.142 That same month, the OHCHR
issued a public statement for the Bali Climate Change Conference (COP13) acknowledging that
“climate change can adversely affect the fundamental human rights of present and future
generations” and reminding the COP that governments have both a moral and legal obligation to
protect and promote basic human rights when tackling climate change.143 The OHCHR
subsequently released a report in 2009 detailing the implications of climate change for the
enjoyment of human rights and for the obligations of states under international human rights
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law.144 Similarly, UNHRC resolutions made at about the same time laid emphasis on the
relationship between the human rights, the environment and climate change.145 This increasing
recognition of the relationship between human rights and the environment as well as climate
change informed the Human Rights Council’s creation of a special mandate “on the issue of human
rights obligations relating to the enjoyment of a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable
environment.”146 Under this mandate, John Knox was appointed as an Independent Expert in 2012
and was given the task of articulating the human rights obligations which relate to the enjoyment
of a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment.147 In his final report, Knox included a draft
of the Framework Principles on Human Rights and the Environment. The Framework Principles
on Human Rights and the Environment highlights the interdependence of human rights and a good
environment by mandating states to ensure a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment in
order to respect, protect and fulfil human rights; and to respect, protect and fulfil human rights in
order to ensure a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment.148 According to the OHCHR:
States have obligations to protect human rights from environmental harm and
obligations to fulfil their international commitments. The foreseeable and potentially
catastrophic adverse effects of climate change on the enjoyment of a wide range of
human rights give rise to extensive duties of States to take immediate actions to prevent
those harms. To comply with their international human rights obligations, States
should apply a rights-based approach to all aspects of climate change and climate
action. Applying a rights-based approach clarifies the obligations of States and
businesses; catalyses ambitious action; highlights the plight of the poorest and most
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vulnerable; and empowers people to become involved in designing and implementing
solutions.149
Another major development in the environment and human rights discourse is the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights (IACHR) Advisory Opinion on the Environment and Human Rights in
2017.150 In this opinion, the IACHR “recognized the existence of an irrefutable relationship
between the protection of the environment and the realization of other human rights, due to the
fact that environmental degradation affects the effective enjoyment of other human rights.”151 In
addition, “the Court emphasized the interdependence and indivisibility between human rights, the
environment and sustainable development,” since the full enjoyment of all human rights depends
on a favorable environment.152
It is equally important to note that discussions on the relationship between human rights and
climate change are gaining traction in the international context under the auspices of the UN
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).153 In COP 16 held in 2010, in Cancún,
Mexico, it was noted that the adverse effects of climate change have implications for the effective
enjoyment of human rights, that the effects will be felt most acutely by those segments of the
population that are already vulnerable, and that States parties should, in all climate change-related
actions, fully respect human rights.154 Also, the relationship between human rights and the
environment is also acknowledged in the Paris Agreement.155 While the main body of the Paris
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Agreement does not mention human rights in its operative provisions as many had hoped, it
included the following reference to human rights in its preamble:
Acknowledging that climate change is a common concern of humankind, Parties
should, when taking action to address climate change, respect, promote and consider
their respective obligations on human rights, the right to health, the rights of
indigenous peoples, local communities, migrants, children, persons with disabilities
and people in vulnerable situations and the right to development, as well as gender
equality, empowerment of women and intergenerational equity.
Over the years, the link between human rights and the environment have come to be recognised
internationally. Although an internationally binding instrument clearly establishing this link or
recognising the right to a healthy environment has not yet been created, there has been
overwhelming recognition of this link regionally and nationally.

2.3. Human Rights with Linkages to Climate Change
Climate change impacts a number of rights and some of these rights as highlighted by the
OHCHR are briefly summarized below.

2.3.1. The Right to Life
The right to life is a fundamental human right.156 The protection of the right to life places
an obligation on states to refrain from intentionally causing the death of any person, and to take
appropriate measures in order to ensure the effective protection of the life of every human being.157
Climate-related deaths are caused by extreme weather events, heat waves, floods, droughts,
wildfires, water-borne and vector-borne diseases, malnutrition and air pollution. Globally, at least
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150,000 premature deaths annually are linked to climate change.158 For example, the heat wave
that struck western Europe in 2003 caused approximately 70,000 premature deaths. 159 The World
Health Organisation, using an optimistic case scenario, projects a highly conservative estimate of
250,000 additional deaths each year due to climate change between 2030 and 2050, resulting from
heatwaves, diarrhoea, malaria and childhood undernutrition.160

2.3.2. The Right to Health
The right to health protects the right of everyone to a standard of living necessary for their
health and well-being.161 The adverse health impacts of climate change include premature deaths,
increased incidences of respiratory disease, cardiovascular disease, malnutrition, stunting, wasting,
allergies, heat stroke, injuries, water and vector-borne diseases and mental illness.162 Hundreds of
millions of people are exposed to extreme weather events annually, resulting in injuries, illnesses
and mental health issues. Additionally, climate change “erodes many of the key social and
environmental determinants of health, including access to adequate food and water, clean air,
culture and livelihoods.”163
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2.3.3. The Right to Food
The right to food denotes the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living as it relates
to the entitlement to adequate food164 and the right to be free from hunger.165 The United Nations
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) identifies climate variability and extremes as “some of
the key drivers behind the recent uptick in global hunger and one of the leading causes of severe
food crises, and the cumulative effect of changes in climate undermines all dimensions of food
security – food availability, access, utilization and stability”.166 According to an estimate by the
World Bank, “a 2ºC increase in the average global temperature would put between 100 million
and 400 million more people at risk of hunger and could result in over 3 million additional deaths
from malnutrition each year.”167

2.3.4. The Right to Water and Sanitation
The United Nations recognizes the human right to water and sanitation and also
acknowledges “that clean drinking water and sanitation are essential to the realisation of all human
rights.”168 As a result of this recognition, the UN has continually urged “States and international
organisations to provide financial resources, help capacity-building and technology transfer to help
countries, in particular developing countries, to provide safe, clean, accessible and affordable
drinking water and sanitation for all.”169 Climate change affects precipitation patterns all over the
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world especially in developing countries, with some dry areas receiving less precipitation and wet
areas receiving more frequent and intense precipitation.170 Climate change adversely affects water
supplies, grazing opportunities and livestock herds, and increasing competition, conflict and
insecurity, which in turn adversely affect indigenous pastoralists in certain areas.

2.3.5. The Rights of the Child
Article 24(c) of the CRC recognizes the right of the child to the enjoyment of the highest
attainable standard of health, and therefore mandates states to ensure that they consider the dangers
and risks of environmental pollution among the factors in protecting this right.171 Climate change
is one of the dangers and risks of environmental pollution and therefore interferes with this right
of the child.
According to the OHCHR, climate change exacerbates the vulnerability of children to
health problems, such as vector-borne diseases, malnutrition, acute respiratory infections,
diarrhoea and other water-borne illnesses.172 Extreme weather events pose unique threats to the
health and well-being of young bodies and minds.173 Globally, over 500 million children live in
extremely high-risk flood zones; 160 million live in high or extremely high drought severity zones;
and 115 million are at high risk because of tropical cyclones.174 It is estimated that by 2040, almost
600 million children will live in regions without sufficient water resources.175 The United Nations
Children’s Fund warns that “climate change will harm the poorest and most vulnerable children
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first, hardest and longest”.176 This right of the child also forms part of the discourse on
intergenerational equity which is discussed in fuller detail in chapter four.

2.3.6. The Rights of Vulnerable Populations
The impact of climate change is felt disproportionately among different groups depending on
social, economic, cultural, political and geographic circumstances.177 These circumstances render
certain population more vulnerable to climate change than others. Such vulnerable groups include
indigenous people, low island states, developing countries, women and children in low-income
countries, elderly persons, persons with disabilities, and so on. These groups contribute the least
to climate change, yet, they are the most impacted. These groups must be able to seek remedies
notwithstanding their disadvantaged position, in line with the PANEL principles outlined earlier.

2.3.7. The Right to a Healthy Environment
The right to a healthy environment denotes the right to a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable
environment.178 The substantive elements of this right include a safe climate, clean air, clean water
and adequate sanitation, healthy and sustainably produced food, non-toxic environments in which
to live, work, study and play, and healthy biodiversity and ecosystems.179 It therefore follows that
the right to a healthy climate is a subset of the right to a healthy environment, until such a time as
the right to a healthy climate is recognised as a standalone right.
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The right to a healthy environment is recognized in law by at least 155 Member States of
the UN.180 These Member States are legally obligated, through treaties, constitutions, and
legislation, to respect, protect, and fulfil the right to a healthy environment.181 This may seem an
overwhelming number. However, when one considers the fact that human rights are meant to be
universal as expressed in the preamble to the UDHR which recognises that human rights principles
are to apply to “all peoples and all nations”182, the remaining nations yet to recognise this right
would seem a more significant number.183 It is important to mention that some scholars have
advocated expanding existing human rights to include environmental rights dimensions
(“greening” of human rights) rather than recognising an independent right to a healthy
environment.184
Notwithstanding the wide recognition and importance of the right to a healthy environment,
the right is yet to be recognized at the international level, as there is no international instrument
that establishes and/or explicitly recognizes this right.185 This non-recognition of the right to a
healthy environment seems to question the universality of this right and its status under
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international human rights law.186 The right to a healthy environment is discussed in more detail
in the next chapter.

2.4. Summary
The conclusion in this chapter is that the legal frameworks under international human rights
law, international environmental law, international climate law as well as domestic constitutions
support the human rights approach to climate change. Notably, international climate law
instruments do not contain strong references to human right. Similarly, the human rights law
instruments do not reference climate change. However, there is sufficient evidence that climate
change violates human rights and that the human right approach is valuable in combatting climate
change. A major challenge identified in this chapter is the absence of recognition of the right to a
healthy environment in the international instruments in spite of an overwhelming recognition of
the right among States.
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Chapter Three: The Relationship between the Right to a Healthy Environment and Climate
Change
The chapter highlights the right to a healthy environment as one of the key components of
the human rights approach. The chapter examines the need for a right to a healthy environment
and theoretical justifications of the right. The chapter thereafter examine the benefits of adopting
the human rights approach and the arguments against the approach.

3.1. The Case for Recognition of the Right to a Healthy Environment
There have been divided opinions on the establishment of a distinct right to a healthy
environment. Some scholars against the recognition of the right have contended that recognizing
the right to a healthy environment would amount to endorsing an anthropocentric approach to
environmental protection.187 The response to this concern would be that the human rights approach
can be remodelled to protect other species and unborn generations and can be employed alongside
other approaches. Others have argued that the right to a healthy environment should not be
recognized due to the difficulty in defining the right.188 The response to this is that the difficulty
in defining the right is not a sufficient reason for rejecting the right, especially since there are other
rights that are recognized despite the difficulty defining them.189 Also, the difficulty in delineating
human rights has been observed to be exaggerated.190 Moreover, the courts and tribunals are there
to delineate the scope of the rights.191 There are also arguments against the recognition of the right
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on the basis that the proliferation of human rights would trivialise the significance of the human
rights framework in its entirety.192 The discussions on the justification of the right to a healthy
environment in the next section is therefore instructive, as they shed light on the need for
recognition of the right.
It has been suggested that not only should the right to a healthy environment be recognised
and codified, but it should be constitutionalised. Boyd observes that the inclusion of environmental
rights in the constitution is “catalytic for stronger environmental laws/regulation and the
enforcement thereof” and that “nations with green constitutions have smaller ecological footprints
and have reduced air pollution up to 10 times faster than nations without environmental provisions
in their constitutions.”193 According to Boyd, the existence of provisions suggestive of
environmental rights in laws other than the constitution does not suffice because “they are far
weaker legally, politically and symbolically than constitutional recognition of the right to a healthy
environment would be.”194 On the other hand, there are also concerns that constitutionalizing
environmental rights leaves decision-making on environmental matters (which is largely a policy
issue) to the interpretation of the court, thereby undermining executive discretion.195 The view in
this thesis is that mere recognition of the right under domestic laws (other than the constitution)
by states does not suffice. An important point to keep in mind is that acts that threaten a healthy
environment are not necessarily illegal as they are oftentimes backed by law. It is therefore
somewhat difficult to contradict express provisions of the law with rights implied from the rights
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to life, health, among other rights. Thus, constitutional recognition of the right could bring more
clarity and potentially elevate the protection of the right above contradictory provisions of other
laws that directly or indirectly empower environment-unfriendly acts. However, it must be noted
that some constitutions only apply to actions by States and cannot be applied directly to acts by
non-state actors.196 In such jurisdictions, it is important for the constitutions to be amended to apply
to non-state actors. In the meantime however, the right has to be enshrined in the human rights
legislation governing the acts of private entities.
With respect to international recognition of the right, there are those who take the view that
the recognition of the right to a healthy environment under international law is not essential to its
existence.197 Bratspies notes that rights are established in a bottom-up process i.e. by victims
seeking redress for violation of their rights domestically before international recognition.198
However, there are also opposing views that the bottom-up process is not the only approach to the
establishment of rights considering the fact that rights enshrined in international law instruments
could serve as catalysts for domestic human rights legislation and action.199
The need for establishment of the right to a healthy environment internationally has become
apparent given the larger responsibility of developed countries for climate change, the
transboundary impacts of which are suffered more by some of the developing states including
small island states. While it benefits citizens within a country, the recognition of the right to a
healthy environment under domestic legislation is not likely to place an obligation on states to
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protect environmental rights beyond the territorial borders of the state since such domestic
legislation does not confer rights on persons outside the country. Consequently, both the previous
and current Special Rapporteurs on human rights and the environment have consistently
recommended the recognition of this right at the international level.
In the Framework Principles on Human Rights and the Environment, the OHCHR highlights
the interdependence of human rights and the existence of a good environment by mandating states
to ensure a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment in order to respect, protect and fulfil
human rights; and to respect, protect and fulfil human rights in order to ensure a safe, clean, healthy
and sustainable environment.200 This provides a compelling basis for the United Nations to move
expeditiously to provide global recognition of the right to a healthy and sustainable environment,
as recommended both by the previous and current Special Rapporteurs on human rights and the
environment. Since the right to a healthy environment is understood to include the right to a safe
climate, it therefore appears that the recognition of the right to a healthy environment
internationally would invariably protect the right to a safe climate under international law.
A key point regarding the right to a healthy environment is that the right has been very central
to the acceptance of human right framing of climate change lawsuits in courts. As will be discussed
in subsequent chapters, virtually all the cases where the court has accepted human rights framing
of climate change have hinged on the violation of the right to a healthy environment whether as a
separate substantive right or as a derivative of other human rights. These decisions highlight the
importance of the recognition of the right to a healthy environment.
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3.2. Theoretical Justifications for the Right to a Healthy Environment
It is important to note that the recognition of the right to a healthy environment does not
imply severance of climate change’s linkages with other human rights, rather it provides a more
direct tool for the human rights approach to climate change, such that the right to a healthy
environment can be enforced alongside other rights. The importance of the recognition of the right
to a healthy environment lies in the fact that it is a more direct right under which human rights
violations can be redressed. The recognition of the right to a healthy environment also provides a
foundation for the right to a safe climate system. According to the OHCHR, “a safe climate is a
vital element of the right to a healthy environment and is absolutely essential to human life and
well-being.”201 As earlier discussed, there is no express recognition of the right to a healthy
environment under international law. 202 Since the right to a safe climate system is a subset of the
right to a healthy environment, the non-recognition of the right to a healthy environment invariably
means non-recognition of the right to a safe climate system. However, from a theoretical point of
view, the right to a safe climate could also be seen as having a wider scope than (or as being
entirely distinct from) the right to a healthy environment. Nevertheless, since the right to a safe
climate appears to be a budding discourse, it may be safer for the time being to think of it as it is
defined within the OHCHR framework i.e. as a subset of the right to a healthy environment. The
frontiers of the right to a safe climate can be further expanded when the right to a healthy
environment has been recognised internationally (if need be).
The non-recognition of the right to a healthy environment has been attributed to the absence
of a theoretical justification for the existence of such a right.203 There are several theories that can
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provide some bases for discussions on how the right to a healthy environment can be justified.
Some of these theories are discussed in this section and include liberal theories of human rights
(natural rights theory, will theory and interest theory) and the feminist theory of relational
autonomy.

3.2.1. Liberal Theories of Human Rights
Since Western liberal theories of human rights have had a significant impact on the
development of international human rights law and appear to be the most widely relied on theories
in evaluating the notion of human rights,204 we will first examine some of these Western liberal
theories – the natural rights theory, the will theory and the interest theory.
The position of the natural rights theory is “that each individual person is entitled to a
number of fundamental claims which derive from their inherent human dignity, [i.e.] things that
are essential to the protection of human nature and dignity, those things necessary for the
maintenance of a life worthy of a human being.”205 For a right to qualify as a human right within
the definition of the natural rights theory, it must be necessary to advance human dignity
(dignity),206 must be justifiable without reference to other human rights (independence),207 and
must be an individual right as opposed to a collective right (individuality).208 Regarding the
indispensability to dignity, the theory posits that “only interests that are essential to one’s standing
as a moral person [and] one’s status as a fully human being are human rights.”209 With respect to
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independence, it is understood that the right must be “independently justifiable, and not merely
instrumental to fulfilment of other rights.”210 Individuality denotes that the right must be held by
individuals and not by groups.211 It is noted that the fact that members of a particular class each
possess the same set of rights does not mean that the rights are possessed by the group as a
collective, but rather individually by the members of that group.212 To justify the right to a healthy
environment as a human right under the natural rights theory may be problematic due to the
formulation of the right to a healthy environment as a collective right enjoyed by all and sundry,
and due to its lack of independence. That is to say the right to a good environment is seen as
important merely because it is incidental or instrumental to the enjoyment of other rights such as
the right to life, the right to health, the right to self-determination, and the rights of indigenous and
minority groups, among other rights.213 Again, the right cannot be said to be advancing human
dignity as the environment is seen as different from the human being under this theory.214 This
conclusion however is based on a narrowed view of what constitutes human dignity, as there is a
strong argument that the right to human dignity encompasses the right to a healthy environment
which will be explored below.215 While it may be concluded that the right to a healthy environment
may not find adequate justification using the natural rights theory, it is possible that an expansive
interpretation of these requirements could support the right to a healthy environment.
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With particular reference to intergenerational equity, it will be difficult to justify the rights
of future generations using the will theory due to the inability of members of future generations to
exercise free will or waive their rights216 and due to the lack of individuality. The will theory of
human rights is premised on the assumption “that rights flow from each individual’s ability to
choose and exercise free will.”217 For a right to be justifiable using the will theory, the holder of
the right would need to have power and control over the right e.g. have the power to waive the
right and to pursue goals different from those of the state.218 Furthermore, the right would likely
have to meet the individuality criterion since the “will” is to be exercised individually rather than
collectively.219 The right to a healthy environment is not likely to be justifiable using the will
theory primarily because “the shared nature of the environment would make it difficult to conceive
of a way for one individual to waive their right to a good environment without impacting on the
equivalent right of other right-holders.”220 With respect to intergenerational equity, the rights of
future generations are not individual in nature but collective,221 and there is doubt whether future
generations are considered “humans” yet so as to be entitled to human dignity. Thus, it is difficult
to justify the rights of future generations using the will theory.
The interest theory posits that “rights are those claims that human beings are entitled to
make by reason of necessity for their well-being or to further their interests.”222 The interest theory
deemphasizes individuality while emphasizing the need to protect fundamental interests.
According to the interest theory, “x has a right if…an aspect of x’s well-being (his interest) is a
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sufficient reason for holding some other person(s) to be under a duty.”223 In other words, interests
are said to be fundamental when they are substantial enough to impose obligations on others.224
The interest theory seems to provide a conceptual justification for the right to a healthy
environment since a healthy environment is largely accepted as being necessary for the wellbeing
of humans.225 Unsurprisingly, natural rights theorists are skeptical about justifying the right to a
healthy environment using the interest theory, since in their view the theory does not explain the
need for a stand alone right, other than its instrumentality in protecting other human interests
(human rights), and thereby failing the independence test.226 An argument can therefore be made
(on the basis of the interest theory) for intergenerational equity that future generations have an
interest in their well-being and as such a duty is imposed on the present generation to ensure that
the climate system is protected.

3.2.2. Dignity Rights Constitutionalism
It has been suggested that a broader understanding of the human right to dignity of the
human person could provide some justification for the right to a healthy environment.227 As
mentioned above, there is a strong argument that the right to a healthy environment can be justified
using the need for dignity. The right to human dignity is arguably the core foundation of all human
rights as evident from the preambular and substantive provisions of the international and domestic
human right instruments.228 However, the nexus between human dignity and the environment is
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often neglected by rights theorists.229 Also, the guidelines for developing human rights laid down
by the UN General Assembly mentions that every right ought to derive from the dignity and worth
of the human person.230 According to Daly, dignity defines interrelationships among people as
well as between individuals and their surroundings.231 Human dignity is “impaired when the
surrounding natural environment is compromised.”232 Thus, the right to a healthy environment, if
seen through the lens of human dignity (“dignifying” environmental rights233), can be justified.
This becomes even more apparent considering the fact that in some jurisdictions including
jurisdictions without provisions of law expressly establishing the right to a healthy environment,
the courts have recognised the right to a healthy environment on the basis of the need to maintain
the dignity of the human person. The dignifying of environmental rights has the potential to
advance climate litigation by defining the cause of action (i.e. providing definition to the seeming
vagueness of the right to a healthy environment), aiding the identification of persons with standing,
and providing remedies to victims of violation.234
While it can be concluded that the right to a healthy environment may not find adequate
justification using the Western Liberal theories, it is possible that an expansive interpretation of
these requirements could support the right to a healthy environment.
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3.2.3. The Feminist Theory of Relational Autonomy and Corporeal Citizenship
A viable alternative to the individualist approach in the aforementioned liberal theories
could lie in the feminist theory of relational autonomy of the human person. This theory sees
humans as relational beings, and as such they cannot always be treated individually. This theory
takes a “joint-and-several” view of the human being. In other words, it must be understood that
humans are individuals as much as they are groups and collective units. This relational theory
posits that “[i]t is the very nature of human selves to be in interaction with others…[and] they do
not exist apart from these relations.”235 Thus, human beings cannot be “seen as essentially separate
from one another” as is the view of the liberal theories, a view termed “the individualism of
traditional liberalism.”236 A relational approach therefore “treats human beings as constitutively
interconnected and interdependent.”237
Drawing from this theory, the concept of “corporeal citizenship” has been posited.
Corporeal citizenship denotes the inseparability of humans from the environment.238 Corporeal
citizenship emphasizes “humans’ inescapable embeddedness in both social and natural contexts
and…emphasises the dynamic connectivity and co-constitutive interactions between human
bodies and the nonhuman natural world.”239 Corporeal citizenship not only emphasizes
interconnection and interdependence among humans, but also emphasizes the relationship between
humans and non-humans. The implication of this interconnection between humans and the
environment is that protection of humans will necessarily involve protection of the environment,
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and vice versa. Thus, the responsibility of States “to manage and protect the health of its population
is inseparable from its responsibility to care for the health of the environment.”240
The theory of corporeal citizenship can prove to be a key theory in the justification of the
right to a healthy environment and in the human rights approach to the environment more broadly.
This is because it erases the divide between the human being and the environment such that the
right to a healthy environment cannot be perceived to be external to humans. This theory obviates
the need for the dignity, independence, individuality, unwaivability questions posed by the liberal
theorists, since the human being is being viewed holistically with the environment being an
essential element of humanity. Due to the wide scope of rights recognised within the concept of
corporeal citizenship, it is likely that the rights of future generations can be justified within this
relational autonomy school of thought.
The Opinion of the IACHR on human rights and the environment seems to reverberate with
this concept of corporeal citizenship. In this decision, the IACHR acknowledged the inseparability
of humans from the environment, the individual and collective connotations of the right to a
healthy environment, the intergenerational implications of the rights, and the interrelationship with
other rights, by emphasizing “the interdependence and indivisibility between human rights, the
environment and sustainable development, since the full enjoyment of all human rights depends
on a favorable environment.”241 The IACHR further stated as follows:
The human right to a healthy environment has been understood as a right that has both
individual and also collective connotations. In its collective dimension, the right to a
healthy environment constitutes a universal value that is owed to both present and
future generations. That said, the right to a healthy environment also has an individual
dimension insofar as its violation may have a direct and an indirect impact on the
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individual owing to its connectivity to other rights, such as the rights to health, personal
integrity, and life. Environmental degradation may cause irreparable harm to human
beings; thus, a healthy environment is a fundamental right for the existence of
humankind.242
Thus, a healthy environment must necessarily be seen as part and parcel of the human being
(individually and collectively), an entitlement of future generations, and inseverable from the other
elements protected by other human rights.

3.3. The Benefits of Adopting a Human Rights Approach to Climate Change
The human rights approach to climate change has a number of benefits to the climate change
movement. A number of these benefits are highlighted in this section.

3.3.1. The Focus on Humans as Victims
According to John Knox, when climate change first began to be linked to human rights, the
effects of climate change were generally often treated as primarily harming future generations or
endangered species.243 Knox notes that “a polar bear on a shrinking ice floe was perhaps the
paradigmatic image, and is still very popular: a search on Google images for “climate change”
finds four pictures of polar bears on ice floes in the first 17 images returned, compared to just one
of a human being.”244 By emphasizing specific threats posed by climate change to human rights,
the human rights approach to climate change propels an expansion of the climate change discourse
from a focus on the impacts of climate change on nonhumans, endangered species and future
242
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generations to include discussions on people who are alive today and already suffering the impacts
of climate change.245 The human rights approach emphasizes the point that climate change is an
existing and prevalent issue and not a futuristic issue, thereby creating a sense of urgency and
forcing relevant actors to act more urgently than they would if emphasis were placed solely on
non-human elements.246 It has been suggested that “a human rights-based approach places the
individual at the centre of our enquiry, helping to put a human face on the problem and tell the
stories of those [affected and] likely to be affected, thereby serving as a tool for advocacy and
promoting public awareness of the injustices inherent in the problem.”247 An example of the effect
of this focus on humans is highlighted by the compelling narrative in the Inuit petition which
empowered the Inuit communities to tell their stories themselves.248

3.3.2. The Moral Force of Human Rights Concepts
The moral force of human rights concepts is another factor likely to spur action to address
climate change because “rights are inherent attributes of human beings that must be respected in
any well-ordered society” and “the moral weight this concept affords exercises an important
compliance pull.”249 In other words, there is a likelihood that states would be more willing to take
action to address climate change when the issue is characterised as a violation of human rights. A
human rights-based approach therefore imbues climate change with a sense of moral urgency.250
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It is important to note however that there are some who hold a view that the human rights approach
does not have the moral pull it is believed to possess.251 For example , it is observed that morality
is an insufficient motivation because the connection between moral judgment and motivation is a
contingent fact; and because people are more likely to act in self-interest than on the basis of
morality.252 This contrary view notwithstanding, there is overwhelming acceptance of human
rights as having a moral effect on states. Thus, it is an important perspective to incorporate within
the climate change discourse.

3.3.3. The Provision of Innovative Legal Mechanisms for addressing climate change
Another benefit of the human rights approach to climate change is that a human rights
framework provides new forums and innovative legal arguments to influence and assist States as
well as other responsible actors to comply with their human rights obligations, persuade courts to
hold States and other responsible actors accountable, and provide remedies for victims of climate
change.253 For instance, climate change ordinarily seems to fall within the scope of international
environmental law due to the fact that it is an environmental issue. However, procedures within
the international environmental law framework are insufficient to address climate change. It has
been suggested that since existing mechanisms for the enforcement of human rights at the
international level are more developed for the purpose of protecting environmental human rights
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than the procedures of international environmental law (for example, the availability of individual
complaints procedure, and availability of more forums254), a human rights approach presents a
viable additional avenue for pursing climate actions.255 However, it has to be noted that there is
sparse reference to the environment in international human right instruments perhaps due to the
fact that these instruments were drafted at a time when environmental protection had not become
(significantly) a matter of international concern.256 Thus, the relationship between international
environmental law and international human rights law ought to be one of complementarity and
interdependence rather than mutual exclusivity.
Attempts to codify the right to a healthy environment have generally recorded little
progress in international law due to several debates about its theoretical basis and practical
underpinnings. The human rights approach avoids these debates by drawing on several existing
rights instruments, conventions, and internationally-agreed-upon norms and standards that have
been recognized and ratified by many countries.257 A human rights-based approach would also
provide a means for positive action and advocacy by groups who lack other avenues under
international law. The human rights language talks about climate change not in terms of economic
impacts or future targets, but in terms of current obligations and existing illegality. 258 The human
rights approach does not seek to create entirely new rights or call for the adoption of new
principles. Rather, it outlines normative guidelines that would assist international regimes and
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national authorities in translating existing human rights goals and standards into practical and
achievable results.259
This benefit (provision of innovative legal mechanism) as discussed in this subsection, is
however without prejudice to the importance of the recognition of the right to a healthy
environment (in addition to existing rights) as discussed later in this chapter.

3.3.4. Filling the Gap in International Climate Change Agreements
Human rights are barely mentioned in international climate change agreements. However,
since States are already obliged under international law to respect, protect and fulfil human
rights260 and a human rights-based approach merely emphasizes these long-standing commitments,
the human rights approach has the potential to effectively integrate human rights into the
international climate change regime, once there is an overwhelming acceptance of the human
rights linkages to climate change.261 The widespread participation of States in international human
rights law allows for climate change issues to be brought within the monitoring and complaints
mechanisms of specific human right treaties. This is already a language well understood by States.
Since the provisions of international climate instruments do not include express provisions on
justiciability, a human rights approach creates an avenue for justiciability of these international
climate law instruments.262
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3.3.5. Highlights Issues of Vulnerability and Inequity
Another benefit of the human rights approach is that human rights can help bring issues of
equity and vulnerability to the foreground of the climate change debate.263 It has been noted that
traditional international environmental law does not consider “specific vulnerabilities of
individuals and communities”, and there is therefore a need for this perspectives to be part of the
climate change conversation.264 A possible solution to this issue lies in the human rights approach.
Since protection of vulnerable groups is one of the objectives of the human rights approach, the
approach provides the most vulnerable with a framework to seek adequate protection against the
impacts of climate change, and provides avenues for them to seek and obtain remedies in line with
the PANEL principles. Since these principles emphasize the requirements for participation and
consultation with affected groups, and non-discrimination, equality and respect for the rule of law,
the principles (if properly implemented) will improve the standards for the decision-making and
negotiation processes, limit corruption, build accountability and enhance the legitimacy and
sustainability of overall policy outcomes. Further, the human rights-based approach is useful in
assessing the relative capacity of States to address climate change and arrive at equitable outcomes
for burden sharing.265 It has also been opined that human rights framing of environmental issues
such as climate change redirects “the focus of inquiry away from experts, technical specifications
and legal categories… and focuses on questions of equality and fundamental justice.”266
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3.4. Arguments against the Human Rights Approach to Climate Change
While this thesis advocates for the rights-based approach to tackling climate change, it is
helpful to note that there are arguments against a rights-based framework. There are doubts as to
whether the human rights approach has indeed had or will have any significant impact on the fight
against climate change.267
A major concern regarding the adoption of a human rights approach to climate change is its
anthropocentric focus i.e. the predominant focus on human to the detriment of other species within
the ecosystem as well as future generations.268 It has been suggested that the rights-based approach
raises a legitimacy question with respect to the power of the courts to delve into climate policy
issues. As will be discussed subsequently, while some courts agree that the issue of climate change
is a policy issue which the court cannot delve into, other courts have taken a contrary view to this
position and have held that the issue of climate change is justiciable regardless of its policy aspects
insofar as it affects human rights.269 This legitimacy concern is due to the fact that climate change
is an issue which transcends the legal framework as it involves a lot of non-legal considerations
such as political, economic and fiscal interests at local, national and international levels. The
balancing of these interests is a policy issue better resolved in democratic forums than legal
forums.270 It has also been suggested that “a rights framework limits our capacity for meaningful
political debate and compromise.”271
Certain critics of the human rights approach to environmental protection are of the view that
the approach creates “unrealistic expectations” because the results are usually not positive, and
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even when they are, a lack of implementation and enforcement of the results poses another
significant hurdle.272 Concerns have also been expressed about the “universality” of human rights
in view of their origins in Western culture. In other words, the human rights approach may not be
suitable for all legal systems.273
Another concern regarding the adoption of a human rights framework to tackle climate
change is the difficulty for victims “to establish a causal link between an established right and the
environmental issue in question.”274 However, the recognition of the right to a healthy environment
could possibly address this problem as there would be a direct environmental right, and damage or
threatened damage to the environment could constitute a violation of the right without the need to
prove violation of other human rights.

3.5. Summary
This chapter concludes that the right to a healthy environment ought to be an integral part of
the human rights approach to climate change. However, the right to a healthy environment is
plagued with theoretical issues especially the lack of theoretical justification of the right. This
chapter concludes that the feminist theory of relational autonomy and the concept of corporeal
citizenship provides the necessary theoretical justification for the recognition of the right to a
healthy environment. The chapter also concludes that the human rights approach offers significant
benefits to climate action.
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Chapter Four: The Principle of Intergenerational Equity: Meaning, Recognition and
Importance
This chapter takes a look at the meaning of the principle of intergenerational equity and
situates this principle within the context of climate change. As stated in the preceding chapter, the
principle is found in the Rio Declaration as well as other international instruments.The aim of this
chapter is to examine the recognition of this principle within international human rights, climate
and environmental law and to examine its intersection with the human rights approach. A
significant portion of the discussions on the meaning of intergenerational equity is drawn from the
work of Edith Bowrn Weiss whose works are very instructive on intergenerational equity. The
United Nations recognise Weiss as a thought leader on intergenerational equity and environmental
law.275
It is contended in this chapter that intergenerational equity is integral to the human rights
approach to climate change. The chapter begins by defining the concept of intergenerational equity
as well as its components and nuances. This examines the recognition of the concept in
international law, reviews some of the theoretical discussions on the rights of future generations,
highlights the interrelationship between the principle and the human rights approach, and
concludes by providing an overview of the intergenerational equity approach to climate litigation.
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4.1. Understanding the Concept of Intergenerational Equity
4.1.1. Elements of Intergenerational Equity
Weiss outlines four criteria behind the theory of intergenerational equity. For any principle
to be in line with intergenerational equity, the following criteria must be met.
1.

Equitability among generations: such principle should be equitable among generations such
that it would neither authorize “the present generation to exploit resources to the exclusion
of future generations,” nor impose “unreasonable burdens on the present generation to meet
indeterminate future needs.”276

2.

Value-Neutrality: principles of intergenerational equity “must give future generations the
flexibility to achieve their own goals according to their own values.”277

3.

Clarity: principles of intergenerational equity “should be reasonably clear in application to
foreseeable situations.”278

4.

Acceptability: principles of intergenerational equity “must be generally shared by different
cultural traditions and be generally acceptable to different economic and political
systems.”279
Weis summarises intergenerational equity into three basic principles which mirror elements

of the planet to be conserved for future generations – conservation of quality, conservation of
options, conservation of access.280 The standards of the quality, options and access to be conserved

276

Weiss, “In Fairness to Future Generations”, supra note 59 at 38.
Ibid.
278
Ibid.
279
Ibid.
280
Ibid at 201 & 202.
277

60

for future generations are those enjoyed by previous generations.281 The three principles are
explained below:
1.

Conservation of quality denotes the responsibility on each generation to maintain the quality
of the planet and to leave same to the future generations in no worse state than it was
received.282

2.

Conservation of options denotes the duty of each generation to conserve the diversity of the
natural and cultural resources, in order not to unduly restrict the options available to future
generations in solving their problems and satisfying their own values as they wish.283

3.

Conservation of access denotes the responsibility of each generation to ensure that its
members have equitable rights of access to the legacy of past generations and should
conserve this access for future generations.284
These three principles translate to three planetary rights for future generations – the right to

quality, the right to diversity and the right to access.285
According to Weiss, the above three principles give rise to five obligations on the present
generation. The first duty is to conserve renewable and non-renewable natural resources.286 The
second duty is to ensure “reasonable, non-discriminatory access to the legacy [i.e. equitable access
to the planet]” – this includes an obligation not to infringe on the access rights of other beneficiaries
and an obligation to “assist those who would otherwise be too poor to have reasonable access and
use.” 287 The third duty is to avoid adverse impacts on the environment.288 The fourth duty is the
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duty to curtail damage, prevent disasters, and ensure availability of emergency aid. 289 The fifth
duty is to compensate for any damage caused to the environment. 290 These five duties, though
owed by all members of the present generation, are to be guaranteed by the State.291 The principle
of intergenerational equity has been critiqued by several scholars as will be discussed subsequently
in this chapter.

4.1.2. The Temporal Scope of Intergenerational Equity Obligations
It is important to mention that the responsibility to hand over the planet in no worse state
than it was received is not only owed to the immediate succeeding future generation, that is to say,
this responsibility is owed to several successive generations. Although Weiss takes the view that
obligations within the context of intergenerational equity are owed to “all generations” and inures
in perpetuity, there is a different view that each generation does not owe this responsibility to every
future generations in perpetuity. This responsibility to conserve resources for the benefit of future
generations is understood to cover up to the seventh generation, that is to say, each generation is
to ensure that the steps taken to protect future generations consider up to at least seven successive
generations following theirs. In other words, the planet ought to be handed over to each succeeding
generation in a condition that would be fit for seven successive generations. This principle has
been referred to as the “seventh-generation principle”.292 This seventh-generation principle has its
roots in the traditions of certain indigenous peoples of North America. The seventh-generation
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principle dates back to the writings of the Iroquois Confederacy293 between 1142 to 1500 AD.294
In 1992, the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) summarized this principle
as follows:
The original law passed down from their ancestors crystallizes the sacred
responsibility of Indigenous people to be the caretaker of all that is on Mother Earth
and therefore that each generation is responsible to ensure the survival for the seventh
generation… The way in which we interact with the earth, how we utilize the plants,
animals and the mineral gifts, should be carried out with the seventh generation in
mind. We cannot simply think of ourselves and our survival; each generation has a
responsibility to ensure the survival for the seventh generation.295
This principle has been acknowledged in a UN Secretary General report on intergenerational
solidarity and the needs of future generations, in an attempt to delineate the scope of “future
generations.”296 The report identifies the promotion of intergenerational solidarity (equity) as an
important piece for achieving sustainable development and examines the extent to which
intergenerational equity is reflected in the sustainable development framework.
The view taken in this thesis however is that in view of the fact that climate change could span
centuries and even millenniums (as is discussed previously), there ought not be future generations
“too remote” to be protected by each generation. This view, however, is from a theoretical
perspective, as the practical implementation may require placing some temporal limit on the
obligations of each generation.
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4.1.3. Intergenerational Equity and the Concept of Justice297
The justification for intergenerational equity is the concept of justice between generations.
Intergenerational equity can be justified within John Rawls’ theory of justice, particularly John
Rawls’ theory of justice as fairness which comprises two principles of justice summarised and
ranked as follows:
First, each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty
compatible with a similar system of liberty for others [greatest equal liberty principle].
Second, social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both: (a) to
the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the just savings principle,
[difference principle & just saving principle] and (b) attached to offices and positions
open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity [equal opportunity
principle].298
The implication of the greatest equal liberty principle for the rights-based approach to
climate change is that everyone has the right to a healthy environment. For future generations,
equal liberty means the maintenance of a certain level of environmental capital by the present
generation while undertaking economic development.299 The difference principle emphasizes the
need to acknowledge the vulnerability of groups disproportionately affected by climate change
such as populations living in low elevation coastal zones, economically disadvantaged states,
women and children, with a view to protecting their interests. The just savings principle is an
addition to the difference principle and is designed to provide a constraint on the impact of the
greatest equal liberty and difference principles on future generations, to ensure that the interests of
future generations are not compromised while protecting interests of the least advantaged in the
present generation. In the absence of the just savings principle, the least advantaged of future
297
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generations may be exploited for the benefit of the least advantaged in the present generation.300
The equal opportunity principle implies the just distribution of natural resources and
environmental services between current and future generations in a manner that ensures that future
generations are afforded “fair equality of opportunity” to benefit from the natural environment and
are able to enjoy the resources based on their own conceptions and not on conceptions
circumscribed by present-day understandings of economic development.301
Intergenerational equity draws on the Rawlsian theory of justice to conclude that
intergenerational injustice of climate change is two-dimensional. Firstly, future generations will
suffer the consequences of current and past greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions for which they are
not responsible. Secondly, future generations will not enjoy the benefits from GHG emissions, at
least not directly.

302

Climate injustice therefore lies in the discrepancy between historical

responsibility for GHG emissions and future impacts of these emissions, and intergenerational
equity seeks to balance out this injustice.

4.2.

The Recognition of Intergenerational Equity under International Law

4.2.1. Intergenerational Equity under International Environmental Law
Intergenerational equity is embodied in a number of international environmental law
instruments. One of the earliest instruments recognizing intergenerational equity is the 1946
International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, which in its preamble recognizes the
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interest of States in safeguarding natural resources – particularly whales.303 Another instrument is
the Stockholm Declaration which states that man has the duties to “protect and improve the
environment for present and future generations,” to safeguard natural resources for the benefit of
present and future generations, to maintain, restore and improve “the capacity of the earth to
produce vital renewable resources,”304 to prevent future depletion of non-renewable resources, and
to prevent serious or irreversible damage occasioned by pollution.305 The Stockholm Declaration
further states that environmental policies must not adversely affect present and future development
of developing countries.306
Similarly, the Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals,
1979 recognises the obligation of States to future generations in its preamble wherein it states that
“each generation of man holds the resources of the earth for future generations and has an
obligation to ensure that this legacy is conserved and, where utilised, is used wisely.”307 In its
preamble, the Convention for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea Against Pollution, 1976 also
mentions the need for Parties to “preserve the marine environment of the Mediterranean Sea Area
for the benefit and enjoyment of present and future generations.”308 The Convention on
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, 1973 in its preamble
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recognizes the need to protect wild fauna and flora as an irreplaceable part of nature which must
be safeguarded for the present generation and “generations to come.”309
Intergenerational equity is one of the principles behind the concept of sustainable
development as evident in the Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development
(Brundtland Report) which officially introduced the concept of sustainable development in
1987.310 The Brundtland Report is replete with several references to intergenerational equity.311
Intergenerational equity is expressly mentioned as one of the legal principles for environmental
protection and sustainable development: “States shall conserve and use the environment and
natural resources for the benefit of present and future generations.”312
The principle of intergenerational equity was again expressed at the 1992 Rio Earth
Summit in the Rio Declaration, which states that “[t]he natural resources of the earth…must be
safeguarded for the benefit of present and future generations”313 and “[t]he right to development
must be fulfilled so as to equitably meet developmental and environmental needs of present and
future generations.”314 It has been suggested that the decision made at the Rio Earth Summit was
a significant step towards “cementing” the principle of intergenerational equity in international
law. This is because the Summit culminated in the Rio Declaration, the Convention on Biological
Diversity and the Convention on Climate Change, all of which embody the principle of
intergenerational equity.315
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However, it is important to note that references to future generations appear mostly in the
preambular parts of international law instruments and “that there is no legally binding instrument
at international level that commits States to the protection of the rights of future generations.”316
This is because the preamble of a treaty is generally understood not to be binding, but is rather
used as an interpretation tool.317 In addition, it would appear that the principle of intergenerational
equity is yet to be confirmed as a principle of customary international law, and therefore yet to
achieve the status of bindingness.318 It has also been suggested that other principles (which are
arguably customary international law principles) such as sustainable development, the
precautionary principle and the common but differentiated responsibility embody the principle of
intergenerational equity.319 The principle of intergenerational equity, being an underlying principle
of sustainable development, has also been identified as an integral component of the rights of the
child as evidenced by the 2015 Children’s Declaration on the World’s Sustainable Development
Goals.320
The principle of intergenerational equity has also been referenced in certain judicial
decisions that are not directly climate change cases but are environmental law decisions. One of
the earliest known judicial decisions on intergenerational equity is the 1993 decision by the
Supreme Court of the Philippines in Minors Oposa v. Secretary of the Department of
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Environmental and Natural Resources.321 In this case, a group of children brought this lawsuit to
stop the destruction of the fast disappearing rain forests in the Philippines on the basis of the right
of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology and the right to self-preservation and selfperpetuation. Arguments on the basis of intergenerational equity were made before the court, i.e.
“that natural resources belong to people of all ages and that if adults were to harvest all of a
country’s resources, they would be stealing from their children, their children’s children, and all
future generations.”322 The Supreme Court, ruling in favor of the children, recognised that the right
to a healthy environment and the right to provide for future generations are fundamental. On the
question of standing, the Court held that since there is an intergenerational responsibility to
maintain a healthy environment i.e. each generation has a responsibility to the next to take steps
to preserve the environment, children may sue to enforce that right for themselves and for future
generations.323 The Court stated thus:
This case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners minors assert that they
represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in
ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the
succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the
succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational
responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.
Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers the "rhythm and harmony of nature."
Nature means the created world in its entirety. Such rhythm and harmony
indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management,
renewal and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries,
wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration,
development and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as future
generations. Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to
preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful
ecology. Put a little differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a sound
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environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure
the protection of that right for the generations to come.324
Furthermore, in a dispute between Hungary and Slovakia at the ICJ, Hungary stopped an
ongoing construction of dams – a project that was being carried out pursuant to a treaty – on
grounds of environmental concerns among other concerns.325 The ICJ while emphasizing the
importance of examining the project’s impact on the environment, acknowledged that damage to
the environment poses risks to present and future generations.326
Throughout the ages, mankind has, for economic and other reasons, constantly
interfered with nature. In the past, this was often done without consideration of the
effects upon the environment. Owing to new scientific insights and to a growing
awareness of the risks for mankind – for present and future generations – of pursuit of
such interventions at an unconsidered and unabated pace, new norms and standards
have been developed.327
The opinion of Judge Weeramantry in the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project Case also relied
extensively on the principle of sustainable development in concurring with the judgment of the
court.328 Also, in Denmark v Norway,329 a dispute between Denmark and Norway regarding
maritime delimitation between Greenland and Jan Mayen, Judge Weeramantry recognized the
principle of intergenerational equity while stating thus:
A search of global traditions of equity in this fashion can yield perspectives of farreaching importance in developing the law of the sea. Among such perspectives deeply
ingrained therein, which international law has not yet tapped, are concepts of a higher
trust of earth resources, an equitable use thereof which extends intertemporally, the
‘sui generis’ status accorded to such planetary resources as land, lakes and rivers, the
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concept of wise stewardship thereof, and their conservation for the benefit of future
generations. Their potential for the development of the law of the sea is self-evident.330
Also, in a dissenting opinion on a dispute between France and New Zealand with respect to
nuclear testing by France, Justice Weeramantry331 again espoused the principle of
intergenerational equity while noting the adverse health and environmental impacts of nuclear
warfare.332 Justice Weeramantry stated the following:
The rights of future generations have passed the stage when they were merely an
embryonic right struggling for recognition. They have woven themselves into
international law through major treaties, through juristic opinion and throught general
principles of law recognized by civilized nations. Among treaties may be mentioned,
the 1979 London Ocean Dumping Convention, the 1973 Convention on International
Trade in Endangered Species, and the 1972 Convention concerning the Protection of
the World Cultural and Natural Heritage. All these expressly incorporate the principle
of protecting the natural environment for future generations and elevate the concept to
the level of binding State obligation.333
The foregoing indicates that the principle of intergenerational equity is a principle that has
been recognised by some courts with respect to environmental protection generally and therefore,
the principle can be applied by the courts (not as binding precedent, but persuasive) within the
context of climate change.

4.2.2. Intergenerational Equity within the Climate Change Regime
Intergenerational equity is also recognised in international climate change instruments. In
1988, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution for the protection of the global climate for
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present and future generations.334 The resolution expressed concerns regarding the increase in
GHG emissions, the attendant effect on the global climate, and the economic and social
implications for present and future generations. Thus, the resolution emphasized the need for
further scientific research on the causes and consequences of climate change, and therefore
recognised the IPCC.335
The United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) passed another resolution recognizing the need
for a scientific study on the possible adverse effects of climate change such as the rise in sea levels
on islands and in coastal areas, especially low-lying coastal areas.336
An important instrument within the international climate change regime is the UNFCCC
which was adopted around the same time as the Rio Summit in 1992. Intergenerational equity is
one of the guiding principles in the UNFCCC337 as evident in the preambular provisions which
state that State Parties are “determined to protect the climate system for present and future
generations.”338 The UNFCCC provides as follows:
The Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future
generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common
but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. Accordingly, the
developed country Parties should take the lead in combating climate change and the
adverse effects thereof.339 [Emphasis added]
Similarly, the inclusion of sustainable development as a guiding principle in the UNFCCC
further buttresses its intergenerational equity component.340 Although the UNFCCC is by its nature
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a legally binding document,341 it would appear that the certain provisions of the UNFCCC are
however non-binding especially in view of the absence of specific mandatory climate targets.342
Notably, the provision requiring the protection of the climate system for future generations (cited
above)343 is not couched in mandatory wording – the word used is ‘should’ not ‘shall’.344
Furthermore, in its preamble, the Paris Agreement acknowledges that intergenerational
equity is one of the considerations for climate action. It states as follows:
Acknowledging that climate change is a common concern of humankind, Parties
should, when taking action to address climate change, respect, promote and consider
their respective obligations on human rights, the right to health, the rights of
indigenous peoples, local communities, migrants, children, persons with disabilities
and people in vulnerable situations and the right to development, as well as gender
equality, empowerment of women and intergenerational equity.345 [Emphasis added]
The Paris Agreement is understood to be a “historic breakthrough”346 due to the fact that “it
is the first multilateral environmental agreement to incorporate references to human rights, the
rights of particular groups, gender equality, and inter-generational equity.”347 However, the
banishment of this principle to the preamble without inclusion in the operative part of the Paris
Agreement vitiates the bindingness of the principle since preambular provisions are usually not
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binding.348 It is worth noting that initial negotiation drafts of the Paris Agreement included direct
references to the interests of future generations.349 As evident from the draft text of the Paris
Agreement, some of the options for wording the preamble and article 2 specified that Parties
protect the climate system “for the benefit of present and future generations” (similar wordings to
article 3.1 of the UNFCCC).350 It was understood however that the phrase “for the benefit of future
generations” be replaced with “intergenerational equity” in the course of negotiations.351 It has
been suggested that the reason for the change in term was the difficulty in determining who has
standing for future generations.352 Ultimately, even the principle of intergenerational equity agreed
on as the preferred phrase was abandoned with respect to article 2 and only retained in the
preamble.353 There are indications that intergenerational equity was included in the Paris
Agreement to resolve the impasse between parties who wanted the inclusion of the principles
versus those who opposed its inclusion.354 The exclusion of intergenerational equity from the
operative part of the Paris Agreement renders “full integration [of the principle] into the
implementation of the [climate] regime less certain.”355 The non-inclusion of intergenerational
equity in the operative part of the Paris Agreement could explain why the principle appears to play
a marginal role in conversations on climate change.356
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An important point to note regarding the Paris Agreement is that the 1.5oC/2oC targets with
respect to the global temperature represent the standard of the planet to be bequeathed to future
generations by the present generation.

4.2.3. Intergenerational Equity within the Human Rights Framework
There is notable absence of intergenerational equity from human right instruments.
However, it has been suggested that the protection of human dignity and equality of rights afforded
to every human being under international human rights instruments do extend to future
generations.357 These instruments include the United Nations Charter,358 UDHR,359 ICCPR,360
ICESCR,361 CRC362 and other instruments.363 In its preamble, the UDHR emphasises that
“recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the
human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world”. It has been suggested
that the reference to “all members of the human family” has elements of temporality such that it
“brings all generations within its scope;”364 and that the mention of “equal and inalienable rights”
alludes to “the basic equality of these generations in the human family.”365 In this regard, Weston
notes that “the future” is a temporal space without outer limits.366
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The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) passed
the Declaration on the Responsibilities of the Present Generations toward Future Generations
which provides that “[t]he present generations have the responsibility of ensuring that the needs
and interests of present and future generations are fully safeguarded.”367 The Declaration of the
Principles of International Cultural Co-operation provides that “each culture has a dignity and
value which must be respected and preserved” and that “all cultures form part of the common
heritage belonging to mankind.”368 As noted by Weiss, if current generations assume the right to
exploit natural and cultural resources at the expense of the wellbeing of future generations, they
will be contradicting the purposes of the United Nations Charter and the spirit of other international
human rights documents.369 It is important to state, however, that the recognition of the duty to
reckon the interests of future generations in the above instruments merely creates a normative or
guiding principle and is therefore unlikely to form a basis of enforceable rights for future
generations.
It is equally worthy of note that in its opinion, the Inter-American Court on Human Rights
(IACHR) recognised the environmental obligations to future generations by stating that “the right
to a healthy environment …constitutes a universal value that is owed to both present and future
generations.”370 This opinion was issued following a petition by the Republic of Columbia
requesting that the IACHR determine the obligation of states towards protecting the environment
and thereby guaranteeing the rights to life and to personal integrity under the articles 4 and 5 of
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the American Convention on Human Rights.371 As stated in chapter two of this thesis, the IACHR
also held that the right to a healthy environment is owed to future generations in its collective
connotation.372
Human rights obligations are tripartite in nature. They include the duty to (1) respect, (2)
protect and (3) fulfil human rights.373 Each of these duties would impose an obligation on a State
with respect to future generations. Firstly, with respect to future generations, the duty to respect
human rights would entail a duty on the duty bearers (the State) not to act in a manner that
compromises the rights of future generations.374 Secondly, the duty to protect human rights of
future generations implies a duty on the State to prevent other entities such as private actors and
other States from violating the rights of future generations.375 Thirdly, the duty to fulfil human
rights denotes a duty on the State “to take positive steps to address the future consequences of
climate change, which is arguably the most significant responsibility vis-à-vis future
generations.”376
From the impacts of climate change on future generations examined previously, it is clear
that the rights of future generations need to be protected. However, there have been arguments
against granting human rights to future generations. Arguments in this regard range from
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theoretical arguments to practical challenges. While some of the theoretical arguments are
examined in the next section of this chapter, the practical arguments are discussed alongside the
litigation cases in subsequent chapters of this thesis. Regardless of these debates, this view adopted
in this thesis is that the tripartite duty of the state to respect, protect and fulfil human rights
translates into a duty (at the very least in principle) to ensure that the rights of future generations
are respected, protected and fulfilled.377

4.3. Overview of the Theoretical Discussions on the Rights of Future Generations
Our discussions so far indicate that the theory of intergenerational equity seeks to achieve
the recognition of the rights of future generations. Although the aim of this thesis is not to
interrogate the many theories on the granting of rights to future generations, a few theories are
worthy of mention in order to appreciate the practical difficulties in litigating the rights of future
generations as will be examined in subsequent chapters of this thesis.
There have been arguments against granting rights to future generations on the basis that future
generations do not have the capacity to hold any rights. A major argument against granting rights
to future generations is that there is uncertainty as to the identity of future generations since our
present-day choices will affect not only future generations “but also determine which people will
exist in future”378 (identity problem). Gosseries gives an instance of this problem by stating that
“our actions and policy choices in fields such as transportation or energy production without any
direct connection with procreation choices will still have an impact on the identity of our children,
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through modifying the timing of our daily activities, including procreative ones.” 379 A counter
argument in response to this identity problem is that the inability to ascertain the identity of
members of future generations does not defeat the accrual of their rights.380 If the actions of the
present generation are capable of impacting future generation, it necessarily follows that such
actions can impinge on the enjoyment of rights, especially since there is certainty that these persons
will be born at some point in the future.381
Another argument against granting rights to future generations stems from the understanding
that members of future generations are not yet born and as such cannot hold rights in the present
generation (non-existence argument).382 In response to this argument, it has been argued that
existing is not a necessary condition for holding rights.383 Unruh illustrates the flaw in the nonexistence argument thus:
Caroline, in the present moment (in 2016), is 10 years old. In 2096, she will, as we
assume, become a nursing case. The same is true for Bert, who will be born in 2018.
Let us assume, as seems reasonable from a rights-based perspective, that there is a
general right for nursing if it is needed. In 2096, undoubtedly both 90-year old Caroline
379
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and 78-year old Bert will have the right to be nursed. This is so although neither 90year old Caroline nor 78-year old Bert exist yet. It seems absurd to argue that 90-year
old Caroline, at the present moment, has a right to be nursed, but 78-year old Bert
doesn't. So either we concede that both of them have a right to be nursed (which could
yield obligations for us now, for example, to build nursing homes), or we deny present
rights to both future Caroline and Bert. Each way, there is no reason why we should
consider future Caroline's rights to be different from future Bert's rights, nor does this
seem intuitively plausible. The upshot is that future persons – at least those of whom
we know that they will exist – have the same rights status as our own future selves.384
Unruh therefore takes the view that since certain rights held by the present generation do not
inure (and as a matter of fact may not inure at any point) but can be protected even before they do,
the rights of future generations can be placed in the same category such that the right can be
protected even before the holders are ready to take benefit. This is why Unruh further argues that
rights should be attached to place holders rather than human beings. Unruh defines “place holder”
to mean “a set of actual individuals whose existence and/or identity is unknown or indeterminate.”
Again, an illustration is useful:
Bob is going for a walk at night along the riverside. He discovers that the fence of a
nearby playground is rusty. While it is still stable at the present moment, in a few years'
time, it might not be stable enough to prevent children from breaking through the fence
and falling into the river. The fence poses a danger to a child that might or might not
exist today. If Bob has an obligation to repair the fence, he has that obligation with
regard to a place holder that is indeterminate both in terms of existence and exact
identity.385
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By this token, future generations are somewhat placed in the same bracket as present
generations such that the same rights held by present generations are also at the same time being
held by future generations since the rights attach to the “place” and not the human being.
Another argument against granting rights to future generations is that the present generation
is unable to determine the preferences of future generations since “we do not know what the future
wants”, “the future cannot speak” and even if it could, all members of the “future would not speak
with one voice.”386 It has even been suggested that future generations might not prefer the
environment in the state it would be but for the actions of the present generation e.g. the preindustrial environment. However, Gaba who takes this view concedes that life and health are the
only preferences that could be uniform and universal among future generations. This concession
in itself tends to defeat the argument that future generations should not be granted rights since we
do not know their preferences. Our knowledge of certain standards, that must be maintained (to
achieve the fundamental wellbeing of the human being) suffices for the purpose of inferring the
preferences of future generations. Barry’s statement is instructive in this regard:
We don't know what the precise tastes of our remote descendants will be... [but] they
are unlikely to include a desire for skin cancer, soil erosion, or the inundation of all
low-lying areas as a result of the melting of the ice-caps. And, other things being equal,
the interests of future generations cannot be harmed by our leaving them more choices
rather than fewer.387
This goes back to the intergenerational equity duty to conserve the quality of the planet and
not to leave the planet to future generations in a condition worse off than it was inherited.
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In view of some of the theoretical arguments above, it can be concluded that there are
theoretical arguments that support the acceptance of human rights obligations towards future
persons. The suggestion in this thesis (as mentioned in the preceding chapter) is that the right of
future generations can be justified using the relational autonomy understanding of the human being
in order to ensure that intertemporal dichotomies between generations are blurred. It is also
important to bear in mind that theoretical justifications cannot be without counter arguments. Thus,
there is need for translation of this right into practical terms. Unfortunately, this seems to be where
the most difficulty lies.388 It must be noted that the difficulties associated with protecting the right
of future generations may not be as unsurmountable since some countries like Argentina, Norway,
Qatar, Dominican Republic have started including provisions protecting future generations in their
constitutions – thereby dispelling the notion that protecting the rights of future generations is a
rather utopian idea.389 In Africa, 22 out of the 54 countries have constitutional provisions
protecting interests of future generations.390 The practical difficulties associated with the granting
of rights to future generations are examined in subsequent chapters of this thesis.

4.4. The Importance of the Intergenerational Approach to the Human Rights Approach
Climate change, human rights and international law regimes treat intergenerational equity as
a guiding principle or at least as an aspirational principle forming the basis of the respective
frameworks. It also appears that there is no conscious effort to recognise the intergenerational
equity trajectory as an integral part of the human rights approach to climate change. The approach
388
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seems to detach both approaches. This is also evident from the dearth of literature addressing the
interrelationship between both approaches. i.e. the human rights approach and intergenerational
approach. The reason for this severance could be attributable to an understanding that human right
norms are not suitable for intergenerational equity. John Knox, for instance, suggests that focusing
on the right of the child and sustainable developments is a more practicable approach.391 This study
posits that there is a strong relationship between intergenerational equity and the human rights
approaches to climate change, and that the relationship is one of complementarity and
interdependence rather than mutual exclusivity. This part of the thesis therefore makes a case for
a conscious recognition of intergenerational equity as part of the human rights approach by
highlighting the benefits of the intergenerational equity perspective to the human rights approach
and vice versa.

4.4.1. Compatibility of Intergenerational Equity with the Human Rights Approach
As indicated in the previous chapter, one of the elements of the human rights approach to
climate change is its focus on protecting the human rights of vulnerable groups. The impact of
climate change is not borne equally or fairly between the rich and the poor; women and men; the
young, old, and future generations.392 The discourse on the vulnerability of these groups therefore
exposes the injustice of climate change impacts as well as the need for climate justice. 393 For future
generations, climate injustice lies in the fact that they will bear the brunt of the impacts of current
and past greenhouse gas emissions climate change despite not being responsible for such
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emissions.394 Furthermore, “future generations will not enjoy the benefits which were generated
by those greenhouse gas emissions, at least not directly.”395
As indicated by scientific studies, climate change will continue to negatively impact rights
linked to climate change such as “the rights to life, health, food, water and sanitation, a healthy
environment, an adequate standard of living, housing, property, self -determination, development
and culture.”396 This injustice to future generations is the intergenerational injustice dimension of
climate injustice. Therefore, “there has been a growing focus on climate justice, which looks at the
climate crisis through a human rights lens and on the belief that by working together we can create
a better future for present and future generations.”397 Climate justice adopts a human-rights
approach in protecting the rights of the most vulnerable and to sharing the burdens and benefits of
climate change equitably and fairly.398 The human rights approach to climate change therefore
presents a framework for the inclusion of intergenerational equity within the climate justice
discourse. Essentially, the human rights approach proffers an answer to the question of how
injustice to future generations “ought to be addressed and corrected by present generations.”399
Conversely, since intergenerational equity sees the protection of intragenerational rights as a sine
qua non for adequate protection of intergenerational rights, intergenerational equity provides an
additional reason for the protection of the rights of the present generation.
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4.4.2. Intergenerational Equity Deemphasizes Presentism
Within the context of the rights of future generations, presentism400 is the view that the
preferences of the present generation should play a dominant role in the formulation and evaluation
of public policies.401 It involves decision-making without considering the effects of such decisions
on future generations. The human rights framework typically involves identification of violations,
perpetrators and victims, and therefore has an overarching focus on the rights of the people who
are in existence.402 The human rights regime is largely premised on presentism. This bias towards
presentism is also evident in the traditional human rights theories (earlier discussed in chapter
three) and in climate action policies, science, and projections which “generally go only as far as
the year 2100.”403 It is important to note however the philosophy behind presentism does not
preclude the consideration of the rights of future generations – the emphasis is that such
consideration must be on the basis of altruism and goodwill, rather than on the basis of
obligation.404
An emphasis on the human right approach without the intergenerational component tends
to limit the focus of climate action to specific instances and threats of human rights violations to
persons already suffering or likely to suffer harm from climate change, while neglecting the human
rights implications of climate change for future generation – it is easier to demonstrate human
rights violations where loss from climate change has occurred or is imminent to a certain
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population, than with respect to unborn persons whose identities and numbers are indefinite.
Therefore, the human rights narrative of climate change does not on its own “convey the full
enormity of the climate crisis”405 since it does not look at the rights of future generations, hence
the need for intergenerational equity.
The intergenerational equity approach therefore transcends the existence or likelihood of a
human right violation since it focuses on the rights of future generations who will bear the brunt
of climate change. Intergenerational equity adopts a utilitarianist approach in the sense that it posits
“that equal weight be attached to the welfare or rights of both present and future human beings.”406

4.4.3. The Importance of the Rights-Based Children and Youth Perspectives
As discussed in the previous chapter, children are one of the groups disproportionately
affected by climate change, hence the relevance of the children and young persons narrative within
the human rights approach to climate change.407 The point has also been made that there is a
presentist approach within the human rights regime which has occasioned a seeming dichotomy
between the rights of the present generation and those of future generations. The perspective of
children and youth within the human rights approach can be of immense importance in blurring
the lines between the rights of present generations and the rights of future generations, since
children and young persons are the bridge between the present generations and future generations.
As Knox puts it:
Many people that will be living in 2100 are not yet born, and in that sense truly belong
to future generations. But many people who will be living then are already alive
405
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today…[T]he line between future generations and today’s children shifts every time
another baby arrives and inherits their full entitlement of human rights. It is critical,
therefore, that discussions of future generations take into account the rights of the
children who are constantly arriving, or have already arrived, on this planet. We do
not need to look far to see the people whose future lives will be affected by our actions
today. They are already here.408
Although Knox acknowledges the difficulty in protecting the rights of future generations,409
he highlights the fact that the rights of future generations may not be as ‘futuristic’ as many
perceive them to be, thereby strengthening the view that the rights of future generations ought to
be protected alongside the rights of the present generation. The rights of the child perspective is
therefore an important part of the conversation on intergenerational equity as highlighted by Knox.
The importance of the children and youth perspective has been highlighted by the growing
number of rights-based climate lawsuits instituted by or on behalf of children and young persons.
These lawsuits are typically not only based on human rights violations but also on intergenerational
equity. The framing of climate change is integral to the way it is perceived, which perspective can
be influenced by the narrative put forward. 410 It has been suggested that litigation presents an
excellent medium for reframing climate change and overcoming “some of the public’s cognitive
hurdles to perceiving the true dangers of climate change.”411 According to Rogers, “[i]n the climate
lawsuits instituted by children and youth, we hear the authentic voices of the children as they turn
to adult forums to safeguard their own future.”412 The fact that children and young persons are
rising to the challenge of fighting for their own rights highlights the failure by adults to protect the
rights of children, who are not only fighting for themselves but for future generations. The young
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ages of children and young climate litigants particularly have a strong potential to make for more
compelling cases.413 Since intergenerational equity finds expression within these human rights
climate cases by children and young persons, these cases are viable avenues for protecting the
rights of future generations. Intergenerational equity therefore stands to benefit from the children
and youth perspectives of the human rights approach to climate change.

4.4.4. Provision of Justification for the Right to a Healthy Environment
As indicated in the previous chapter, there are questions regarding the justification of the
right to a healthy environment for reasons other than its instrumentality to ensuring the full
enjoyment of other human rights such as the rights to life, health, and other rights. These queries
are borne out of the traditional understanding of the human rights regime. The answer to these
queries may, on some level, lie within the principle of intergenerational equity, which may provide
some justification for the recognition of the right to a healthy environment.
Lewis identifies the potential of justifying the right to a healthy environment on the basis
that future generations have an interest in “having the environment preserved for them, so that they
might enjoy the same benefits of access and use that we have enjoyed.”414 Lewis acknowledges
that there is a duty by the present generations to protect the environment for the benefit of future
generations,415 but concludes that the justification of the right to a healthy environment using the
rights of future generations is impossible because the rights of future generations to a healthy
environment “do not create a new right to a good environment for future generations, any more
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than our present interests in enjoying clean water, adequate food and good health create that right
for people living today.”416
The view in this thesis is that Lewis’ conclusion (on the impossibility of employing the
rights of future generations as a justification for the right to a healthy environment), if examined
with an intergenerational equity lens, seems like an oversimplified notion of the rights of future
generations. Lewis’ view does not seem to consider the three principles that give rise to the duties
and rights within the intergenerational equity theory i.e. conservation of options, conservation of
access and conservation of quality. While conservation of quality may involve references to other
human rights such as life, health, housing, and other rights, obligations arising from conservation
of options and access cannot, to a large extent, be said to be dependent on or instrumental to
achieving other rights. An argument that may arise with respect to options and access is that both
principles seek to achieve equality between generations and can therefore be said to be aimed at
achieving the right to equality. However, this is merely coincidental with the very essence of
intergenerational equity which is to achieve equality between generations.
Again, a relational account of intergenerational justice based on the feminist theory of
relational autonomy becomes important in addressing theoretical questions regarding the lack of
individuality among future generations and their inability to exercise control i.e. make direct input
to the decisions made for their benefit. This relational perspective on intergenerational equity
“demands that we solicit diverse past and contemporary perspectives on futurity, and take these
seriously in defining our obligations to future persons and communities.”417 On the question of
individuality, the relational theory posits “that interests, aspirations, and capacities are both forged
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in relation to other persons, and realized through relations with other persons;”418 thereby obviating
the need to establish the individuality of future generations, especially since their interests can be
realized through other people.
Although the above theories are subject to critique, there is no doubt that intergenerational
equity provides a valuable theoretical perspective regarding the need for the right to a healthy
environment.

4.4.5. A Solution to the Imprecision and Fluidity of the Concept of Sustainable Development
Sustainable development is defined as “development that meets the needs of the present
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.”419 This definition
is demonstrative of the fact that intergenerational equity is one of the underlying principles of
sustainable development. Sustainable development should therefore be a tool for achieving
intergenerational equity. However, the concept of sustainability has been found to be too
“vague”420 and “polysemous”,421 and as a result has been interpreted in different ways: as a set of
guiding criteria for human action, as a goal of humankind, and it has even been interpreted as
permitting exploitation and the production of fossil fuels.422 This ambiguity is occasioned by the
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goal of sustainable development which is to strike a balance between maintaining “economic
advancement and progress” and “protecting the long-term value of the environment.”423
Although the UN recognized the importance of human rights to sustainable development
through the adoption of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development,424 there is still a lot of
ambiguity. Questions with regard to intergenerational equity such as questions regarding the
meaning of future generations, the nature of the relationship between present and future
generations, the duties and obligations of the present generation, and the specific rights of future
generations, still remain unanswered. As a matter of fact, references to future generations are very
sparse within the 2030 Agenda.425 Furthermore, the sustainable development framework is not
framed in rights and obligations language and is devoid of enforcement mechanisms. Even the
reference to “rights and equity” as the basis for the sustainable development goals speaks
exclusively to the rights of the present generation.426 Thus, the sustainable development framework
does not sufficiently cater for the interests of future generations. While it is understood that the
sustainable development principle is in the realm of soft law, the human rights framework has been
identified as a tool through which the SDGs could be achieved. The SDGs themselves reference
international human right law.427 However, the human rights framework answers questions
regarding the nuances of protecting the interests of future generations. For the human rights
framework to be effective as a tool for sustainable development, intergenerational equity has to
423
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form an integral part because it will bring clarity to the ambiguities regarding the interests of future
generation within the sustainable development framework.

4.5. Summary
There are references to intergenerational equity in international law instruments, albeit in
preambular provisions. There are several theoretical questions on the grant of rights to future
generations. However, these theoretical questions are not unanswerable. The principle of
intergenerational equity is an important piece for the advancement of the human rights approach
to climate change.
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Chapter Five: Analysis of Decisions of Courts on Human Rights-Based Climate Cases
This chapter undertakes a case-by-case analysis of the human rights-based decisions by
examining the arguments put forward in each of these cases and the decisions of the courts in the
cases. The chapter highlights the components and roles of the right to a healthy environment and
intergenerational equity in each of these cases. The chapter first examines the cases where the
plaintiffs’ claims are granted, and thereafter those were the court refused the claims of the
plaintiffs.
There appears not to be generally accepted criteria to determine if a climate case qualifies as
a human rights climate change case. For the purpose of the thesis, cases categorised as human
rights cases were found in the Sabin Center for Climate Change Law database.428 These cases
classified as human rights-based cases in the Sabin Centre database are cases where plaintiffs argue
that failure of government to reduce GHG emissions violates their human rights. Thus, this thesis
relies on the cases classified as human rights-based climate cases by the Sabin Center.429 The cases
examined in this chapter are those available in the database as of June 2020. Thus, some of the
cases are still pending while other could still be appealed. Some of the decisions are unavailable
in English, thus reliance is placed on unofficial translations. The focus of the analysis of these
cases is on the decision of the court, and in some cases, arguments put forward by plaintiffs and
defendants. Cases which are filed but are yet to be decided are not discussed in this chapter but are
mentioned in chapter six.430
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5.1. Decisions where Plaintiffs’ claims were granted
5.1.1. Urgenda Foundation v. State of the Netherlands431
Urgenda, a foundation established to stimulate and accelerate the transition processes to a
more sustainable society, instituted this suit for itself and on behalf of 886 citizens alleging that
the Netherlands climate policy target of reducing GHG emissions to 14 - 17% below 1990 levels
by 2020 is insufficient to meet its commitment to a 30% GHG emissions reduction by 2020
compared to 1990 levels,432 insufficient to maintain global temperature below 2oC, and will lead
to catastrophic consequences. Urgenda argued that the failure by the Netherlands to adequately
limit GHG emissions violates the Dutch citizens’ rights to life as well as respect for private and
family life under the ECHR,433 and amounts to a breach of its duty to “keep the country habitable
and to protect and improve the environment.”434 Urgenda sought to protect the rights of both
current and future generations of Dutch citizens as well as globally. The Netherlands argued that
Urgenda has no cause of action since it seeks to defend rights and interests of citizens of other
countries, and that there is no real threat of unlawful acts by the Netherlands against Urgenda. The
Netherlands further argued that it is on course to achieve the global goal of limiting the temperature
to 2oC but has no legal obligations to take measures to achieve the targets stated by Urgenda; and
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that the suit was asking the court to interfere with the State’s discretionary power contrary to the
doctrine of separation of powers.
Decision of the Court: The Hague District Court found that the reduction target of 1417% is below the standard necessary for keeping global temperature below 2oC as established by
international science as well as international climate policy, and therefore ordered the Netherlands
to “reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 25-40% by 2020 to realise the 2°C target.”435 The Court
also found that the Netherlands is in breach of its constitutional duty to protect the environment.436
With respect to the argument on separation of powers, the court stated that Urgenda’s claims if
allowed will not interfere with the State’s power to take legislative or policy measures to determine
how to comply with the order, especially since the State was not arguing that it is incapable of
executing the order.437 While the Court held that Urgenda could bring the action on its own behalf,
the question of Urgenda’s standing in respect of the 886 principals was left unanswered, since
Urgenda’s capacity was enough to maintain the suit.438
The Court also noted that although Urgenda could not directly rely on international climate
instruments as the obligation arising therefrom is between states, Urgenda could rely on the
national standards set by the Netherlands. The Court held that the concept of sustainability has
intergenerational dimensions and criss-crosses territorial boundaries, as such Urgenda could sue
on behalf of future generations of Dutch citizens. The Court however took the view that it is
unnecessary to allude to the rights of current and future generations of other countries since
Urgenda’s standing in respect of current and future generations of Dutch citizens suffices to sustain
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the suit.439 The Netherlands appealed the decision to the Court of Appeal, while Urgenda cross
appealed the portion of the decision by the lower Court that Urgenda could not claim breach of the
rights to life and private/family life. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, allowed Urgenda’s
cross-appeal and upheld the rest of the decision of the Hague District Court.440
Intergenerational equity: Urgenda sought to protect the interests of current and future
generations of Dutch citizens as well as those of other countries. While conceding that Urgenda
has standing to act on behalf of the current generations of Dutch citizens, the Netherlands deferred
to the Court’s opinion on the question of Urgenda’s standing on behalf of future generations of
Dutch citizens. The Court held that interests of future generations could be defended in line with
the principle of sustainable development which Urgenda seeks to protect as one of its objectives
as an organisation.441 The Court therefore stated that the Netherlands has a duty towards addressing
the climate injustice between current and future generations.442 Although foundations such as
Urgenda are permitted to commence law suits under Dutch Law, it would seem that the Court may
not have granted Urgenda standing in respect of future generations if protection of the rights of
future generations could not be inferred from the objectives in Urgenda’s articles of association.443
This is because under Dutch law, foundations can only bring a legal claims by way of collective
action in respect of specific interests the foundation seeks to protect as stated in its articles of
association.
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The right to a healthy environment: The Court agreed with the submissions by Urgenda
that the failure by the Netherlands to adequately reduce GHG emissions is a violation of its
constitutional duty to protect the environment and ensure that the country is in habitable condition.
In the absence of an express right to a healthy environment in the ECHR, the Court also decided
that the right to life is violated where “certain activities endangering the environment are so
dangerous that they also endanger human life.”444 The lower Court also took the view that
environmental degradation violates the right to respect for private and family life (articles 2 &
8).445 However, the lower Court decided that Urgenda, not being a natural person, cannot allege
breach of its rights to life and to respect of private and family life as “a legal person’s physical
integrity cannot be violated nor can a legal person’s privacy be interfered with.”446 This decision
of the Court regarding the inability of Urgenda to claim a violation of the rights to life and family
life was overturned by the Court of Appeal, which decided that Urgenda can rely on Articles 2 &
8 because the restriction by article 34 ECHR447 only applies to the ECtHR and not domestic courts
and tribunals.448 This decision was also upheld by the Supreme Court of the Netherlands in 2019.449

5.1.2. Leghari v. Federation of Pakistan450
This action was instituted at the Lahore High Court by a Pakistani farmer against the
government of Pakistan alleging that the Government has failed to implement the national climate
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policies,451 and that this failure amounts to a violation of his fundamental rights to life and to
dignity of the human person.452 The petitioner argued that “international environmental principles
[just] like the doctrine of public trust, sustainable development, precautionary principle and
intergenerational equity form part of the abovementioned fundamental rights [life and dignity] also
stand offended.”453 According to the petitioner, the most urgent threat of climate change in
Pakistan is unavailability of water, food and energy security.454
Decision of the Court: The Court agreed with the submissions of the petitioner and
constituted a standing committee on climate change which will ensure that the national policies
are implemented and to provide the court with periodic updates. In 2018, a report was submitted
to the Court which indicated that between the time of the decision455 to January 2017, 66 percent
of the measures contained in the national policy had been implemented. The Court acknowledged
a shift in environmental protection paradigm from environmental justice to climate justice. While
the former involves issues such as air pollution, urban planning, water scarcity, deforestation;456
the latter “links human rights and development to achieve a human-centered approach,
safeguarding the rights of the most vulnerable people and sharing the burdens and benefits of
climate change and its impacts equitably and fairly.”457
Intergenerational equity: Apart from general comments by the court to the effect that
intergenerational equity is an interpretative aid to the constitutional provisions protecting the rights
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to life and human dignity,458 the court made no comments on intergenerational equity or the rights
of future generations.
Right to a healthy environment: The Court held that the rights to life includes the right
to a healthy and clean environment. The entirety of the suit was treated by the Court as a writ of
kalikasan (a legal remedy designed for the protection of one’s constitutional right to a healthy
environment).459 The court held that the right to water is inextricably linked to the environment,
land and other ecosystems.

5.1.3. In re Court on its own motion v. State of Himachal Pradesh460
India’s National Green Tribunal (NGT)461 on its own motion462 petitioned the State of
Himachal Pradesh in India over black carbon emissions caused by a surge in vehicular activities
around the Rohtang Pass (an extremely busy mountain pass for tourists), which resulted in rapid
melting of glaciers, blackening and browning of snow cover in mountains, emissions of unburnt
hydrocarbon/carbon soot and other damage to the environment, biodiversity and the climate.
Decision: The NGT further made a finding that this damage to the environment violates
the right to a clean and decent environment as well as the right to life. Ultimately, the NGT ordered
the State Government of Himachal Pradesh to takes steps to address the pollution issue including
458
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embarking on massive reforestation programs, application of Green Tax Funds sourced from
tourists and travellers463 towards pollution control and development of an ecologically friendly
market, regular pollution checks, restriction of transport means in certain areas to green transport
(such as electric vehicles), banning of vehicles older than 15 years old, and providing periodic
updates to the NGT, among other directives.
Right to a Healthy Environment: the court had found that although the obligation of the
state to protect the environment464 is not justiciable as it forms part of the Directive Principles of
State Policy,465 the NGT interpreted the right to a clean and decent environment to be an essential
component of the right to life by stating that “the right to life is a right to live with dignity, safety
and in a clean environment.”466
Intergenerational Equity: The NGT made some sparse reference to intergenerational
equity by stating that government development agencies while reaching decisions ought to
consider “the obligation of the present generation to preserve natural resource and pass on to future
generations an environment as intact as the one we inherited from the previous generation;”467 and
that the principle of intergenerational equity is an integral part of the right to life. It is important to
observe that the references to intergenerational equity do not form part of the NGT’s ratio
decidendi,468 but are mere obiter dicta.
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5.1.4. Supreme Court of Mexico Ruling on Modification to Ethanol Fuel Rule469
In 2017, Mexico’s Energy Regulatory Commission (CRE) amended the specifications for
the components of petroleum products to permit a maximum 10% ethanol in gasoline,470 thereby
increasing the pre-existing 5.8% blend level nationwide, excluding the three most populous cities.
However, an environmentalist471 sued the CRE, arguing that the increase in the amount of ethanol
in gasoline is harmful to air quality and the environment.
Decision: The Supreme Court of Mexico declared the regulation, which permitted an
increase in ethanol content in gasoline, invalid on the basis that the CRE failed to evaluate the
environmental and scientific impact of increasing ethanol in gasoline (precautionary principle); to
engage the public in reaching the decision to increase ethanol; to analyse the standards against
Mexico’s international climate commitments under the Paris Agreement; and to consider the
effects of the increased ethanol on the human right to a healthy environment. The court however
gave producers, who produce or sell 10% ethanol blends, 180 days to sell their products before the
ruling comes into effect. Thus, the ruling banning gasoline containing above 5.8% ethanol takes
effect in July 2020. The Court relied on several international instruments including the Paris
Agreement, Rio Declaration, the Stockholm declaration, the Bali Guidelines, and Special
Rapporteur reports linking climate change to human rights violations. The Court acknowledged
the impacts of climate change to the rights to life, well-being, health, food, water and the right to
a healthy environment all guaranteed in the Mexican Constitution.
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Right to a healthy environment: The Court interpreted the right to a healthy environment
which is guaranteed by Mexico’s Constitution472 as embodying the duties to consider the
precautionary principle and the right of public participation in environmental decision-making.
Intergenerational equity component: Although intergenerational equity does not form
the core basis of the decision, the court acknowledged the intergenerational dimensions of the right
to a healthy environment as well as the precautionary principle. The Court stated that both concepts
do not only encompass consideration of short-term and/or medium-term environmental problems,
but also include long-term issues and are linked to the well-being of future generations, hence the
need for protection of the environment for present and future generations.

5.1.5. Future Generations v Ministry of the Environment473
A group of 25 children and young persons between the ages of 7 and 25 filed this action
against the government of Colombia alongside municipalities and government corporations
alleging that the government has failed in its commitment under the Paris Agreement and domestic
law474 to reduce GHG emissions and “to reduce the net deforestation to zero in the Colombian
Amazon by 2020.”475 The plaintiffs argued that the despite these obligations on the government,
deforestation has continued to be on the rise476 and that the failure by the government to adopt
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appropriate measures to reduce deforestation has severe implications for the Amazon as well as
the country as a whole, and constitutes a violation of their rights as well as those of future
generations. The plaintiffs submitted that the absence of “appropriate measures to deal with… [the
situation] has dire consequences for the places of their residence, alternating [i.e. affecting] their
living conditions, and cutting off the possibility of enjoying a healthy environment.”477
Decision: The Court in its decision agreed with the plaintiffs and found that the
deforestation of the Amazon would increase GHG emissions and the global warming impacts
thereof, damage/limit the water resources of the populace, and ultimately violate the plaintiffs’
rights to life, health and a healthy environment. Consequently, the Court ordered the federal
government, the other tiers of government as well as the public corporations to respectively
develop strategies, action plans, and policies towards reducing deforestations rate to zero and
tacking climate change more broadly.
Intergenerational equity component: The Court undertook a full-on analysis of the
principle of intergenerational equity and this formed the ratio decidendi of the court in this case.
The Court took the view that a healthy environment is a sine qua non for the protection of the
rights of not just children, but of future generations.478 The Court held that protection of
fundamental rights entails protection of not just the individual but of non-human species as well
as future generations. The Court further stated that the scientific climate forecasts indicate that
future generations will be directly affected unless the deforestation rate is reduced to zero.
According to the Court, “the environmental rights of future generations are based on the (i) ethical
duty of the solidarity of the species and (ii) on the intrinsic value of nature.” With respect to the
ethical duty, the Court referred to future generations as “tributaries, recipients and owners” of the
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planet “who do not yet have physical hold of [it].”479 Notably the court ordered “the construction
of an intergenerational pact for the life of the Colombian Amazon to adopt measures[,] aimed at
reducing deforestation to zero and greenhouse gas emissions [and which] has national, regional,
and local implementation strategies of a preventative, mandatory, corrective, and pedagogical
nature, directed towards climate change adaptation.”480
The right to a healthy environment: The Supreme Court recognized that “that the
fundamental rights of life, health, the minimum subsistence, freedom, and human dignity are
substantially linked and determined by the environment and the ecosystem”.481 Regarding the
intrinsic value of nature, the court takes an ‘ecocentric-anthropic’482 view of the human being
which sees the environment as part and parcel of the human being as opposed to the traditional
anthropocentric system which sees the human being as different from the environment.483 This
approach by the court is somewhat in line with the relational feminist theory discussed in the
preceding chapters of this thesis. The Court acknowledged the existence of “a binding relationship
regarding the environmental rights of future generations”.484 The Supreme Court therefore
declared that the Colombian Amazon accordingly was entitled to protection, conservation,
maintenance, and restoration.
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5.1.6. Gbemre v. Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Ltd.485
This is the decision of the Federal High Court of Nigeria where the Applicant challenged
the continuous gas flaring by a multinational petroleum company (Shell) in the course of the
latter’s oil exploration and production activities in the Applicant’s community on the ground that
the activities amounted to a gross violation of the constitutionally guaranteed rights to life and
dignity of the human person486 and the rights to health, to a general satisfactory environment
favourable for development, and to respect for life and integrity protected by the African
Charter.487 The applicant argued that the aforementioned rights necessarily include the right to a
clean, poison-free, pollution-free and healthy environment. The applicant argued that the gas
flaring by Shell occasions many hazards including pollution of the environment and contribution
to climate change.488
The Court in its judgment agreed with the applicant and held that the continued flaring of gas by
Shell constitutes a violation of the rights of the applicant’s community to life (which includes the
right to a healthy environment) and to dignity of the human person.
Right to a healthy environment: The Court decided that the rights to life and dignity of
the human person inevitably include the rights to a clean, poison-free, pollution-free healthy
environment. The part of the Nigerian Constitution containing environmental obligations of the
government is not justiciable. The Nigerian Constitution directs the government to “protect and
improve the environment and safeguard the water, air and land, forest and wildlife in Nigeria” in
Chapter II: Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy. However, the
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Constitution itself provides that the provisions in this chapter II are not justiciable, and as such no
legal action can arise upon contravention of the said chapter.489 Consequently, the environmental
rights created by section 20 of the Constitution are not enforceable. This is the likely explanation
for why the applicant did not as much as refer to this provision, but rather relied on the rights to
life and human dignity.
Intergenerational equity: there is no mention of intergenerational equity or the rights of future
generations in this case.
It is however important to note that the same court faced with a similar case Opara vs. The Shell
Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria,490 took a different approach. The plaintiffs
complained of pollution from gas flaring as a violation of their fundamental right to a healthy
environment, and ultimately their rights to life and dignity of the human person (albeit without
reference to climate change as one of the effects of the gas flaring). In its decision, the Court
refused to recognize the right to a healthy environment as a fundamental right, the reason being
that the right is not within the contemplation of the fundamental rights created under the
Constitution. Notably, the decision was given by the Federal High Court, just like the Gbemre
case. However, the Opara case proceeded to the Court of Appeal.491 The Court of Appeal affirmed
the decision of the Federal High Court on the ground that the main claim in the suit is pollution
generated from gas flaring and as such, cannot be clothed as a fundamental right enforceable under
the Constitution or the African Charter. For avoidance of doubt, the Court of Appeal stated thus:
The issue of gas flaring, oil exploration and environmental impact assessment which
are the substantive complaint of the appellants in this case, are not issues of
fundamental right. There is no legal craftsmanship found in this case that can weave
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them into fundamental rights to life and dignity of human persons under Chapter IV
of the Constitution or under the African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights.
This pronouncement appears to significantly whittle down the enforceability of the environmental
rights provisions contained in the African Charter and the Constitution. There is no doubt that the
approach of recognizing the right to a healthy environment as one of the incidents of the right to
life and dignity of human persons would advance climate change rights, as such climate change
rights could be enforced as fundamental rights. However, by the doctrine of judicial precedents 1,
the position of the Federal High Court in the Gbemre case has been overridden by the decision of
the Court of Appeal on the Opara case, the latter being a superior court.

5.2. Cases resolved against the Plaintiffs
5.2.1. ENvironnement JEUnesse v. Procureur General du Canada492
Environnement Jeunesse (ENJEU), a non-profit organisation, sought leave to institute a class
action before the Quebec Superior Court on behalf of all Québec residents aged 35 and below493
against the Federal Government of Canada. The action for which the ENJEU applied for leave
sought a declaration that Canada’s failure to put in place measures to curb global warming amounts
to a violation of the fundamental rights of children and young persons guaranteed under the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the Québec Charter of Human Rights and
Freedoms.494 The rights alleged to have been violated are “the right to life, integrity and security;
right to a healthful environment in which biodiversity is preserved; and the right to equality.”495
ENJEU argues that the targets adopted by Canada in the face of international agreements are not
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sufficient, yet Canada is not even able to meet those targets; that Canada has so far missed its two
previous GHG emissions reductions targets and is off course for its 2020 target. In view of the
human rights violations occasioned by this failure to limit global warming, ENJEU seeks
authorization for its class action. In response, Canada argued that a class action is not necessary
given the nature of the reliefs sought, hence an application by one person would have sufficed as
an order in respect of one person would benefit all Quebeckers of the represented class. Canada
further argued that the matter is not justiciable because it is of a political nature and any order
made by the court would be a contravention of the doctrine of “separation of powers and
parliamentary sovereignty.”496 Canada for these reasons among others prayed the court to dismiss
the application for authorization to institute a class action.
Decision: The Court in its decision rejected the contention that the suit was not justiciable
and held that the requirement of justiciability does not rob the suit of competence since “all
government power must be exercised in accordance with the Constitution.”497 However, the Court
refused the application for authorization on the ground that ENJEU failed to proffer “a factual or
rational explanation” for its choice of restricting the class it represents to persons 35 years and
under.498 The relevance of this restriction is that the facts alleged by ENJEU indicate that persons
not within the class sought to be represented (but having the same interest)499 have been arbitrarily
excluded, which exclusion is contrary to the procedure for class actions. The Court further noted
that the class as delineated by ENJEU is also problematic because it includes minors who did not
yet possess the capacity to exercise all civil rights, thereby compelling minors to be parties to the
suit and conferring ENJEU with power to impose an obligation on parents to take steps to exclude

496

ENJEU, para 18.
Ibid, para 59.
498
Ibid, para 117.
499
According to the Court the alleged human violations would extend to persons who are above 35 years.
497

108

their children from the suit – ENJEU is not statutorily empowered (i.e. empowered by a special
statute) to protect children and cannot be allowed such power. In conclusion, the Court stated that
a class action is not the appropriate vehicle for the nature of the claims by ENJEU and agreed with
the submissions by Canada that the suit even if brought by one person “without the need to proceed
as a class action” would have an “erga omnes effect.”500 In other words, the suit ought to have
been brought by one person. ENJEU has filed an appeal against the dismissal by the court.501
The right to a healthy environment: Although there is no right to a healthy environment
under the Canadian Charter, ENJEU relied on the Quebec charter which states that “[e]very person
has a right to live in a healthful environment in which biodiversity is preserved, to the extent and
according to the standards provided by law.”502 The Court agreed with the submission by ENJEU
that the Quebec Charter binds the Federal Government and is applicable.503 ENJEU further argued
that the “protection of human beings is inseparable from the protection of the environment”504 and
therefore forms part of the rights to life, inviolability and security of the human person. The Court
made no pronouncement on the inseparability of humans from the environment, perhaps due to
the fact that the court did not go into the merits of the case.
Intergenerational Equity component: The suit is not brought on behalf of future
generations as evident from the limit of the class to those 35 years and below as of the given date.
However, ENJEU alluded to a duty owed to future generations while highlighting the failure by
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Canada to set adequate GHG reduction goals.505 There is no concrete attribution of right to future
generations by ENJEU.

5.2.2. Armando Carvalho v European Parliament and the Council506
Thirty seven plaintiffs comprising youths, children alongside their parents from France,
Fiji, Germany, Italy, Kenya, Portugal, Romania and an association (an NGO) of young indigenous
Sami people instituted this action against the European Parliament (EP) and the European Council
(EUCO) before the European Union General Court arguing that the 2030 GHG emissions
reduction target507 set by the EU is insufficient and therefore threatens the fundamental human
rights of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs sought annulment of the provisions of three separate EU
legislative acts508 which embody the said EU GHG emission reductions target.509 The plaintiffs
argued that the insufficient emissions policy as contained in these legislative acts violate their
rights to life, health, occupation and property under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and
violates the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), UNFCCC and the Paris
Agreement. The Defendants contended by way of a preliminary objection that the court should
dismiss the action as inadmissible because the plaintiffs are not sufficiently, directly and
individually affected by these legislative acts. This contention was based on the TFEU, which
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provides “any natural or legal person may institute proceedings against an act addressed to that
person or that is of direct and individual concern to them, and against a regulatory act that is of
direct concern to them and does not entail implementing measures.”510 The Defendants argued that
the provisions of the contested legislative acts are of general application to an indeterminate
number of persons and the infringements alleged by the plaintiffs do not distinguish them
individually.
Decision: The Court in its decision held that for the contested legislative act to be said to
affect the plaintiffs’ individual rights, it must “affect them by reason of certain attributes that are
peculiar to them or by reason of circumstances in which they are differentiated from all other
persons.”511 The Court concluded that “[t]he applicants have not established that the contested
provisions of the legislative package infringed their fundamental rights and distinguished them
individually from all other natural or legal persons concerned by those provisions.”512 The Court
therefore dismissed the suit without considering the merits. The plaintiffs have appealed against
this decision.513
The right to a healthy environment: the court made no pronouncement on the rights to a
healthy environment. However, the plaintiffs had mentioned in one of its paragraphs that the right
to life and health are dependent on the existence of an environment which allows human life to
exist.514
Intergenerational equity: The court made no pronouncement on the rights of future
generations since it did not delve into the merits of the case. However, it is observed that the
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plaintiffs merely alluded to intergenerational justice and the rights of future generations while
expounding the inequality occasioned by climate change in violation of the right against
discrimination on grounds of age.515 The right of future generations does not form the core of their
claim.

5.2.3. Friends of the Irish Environment v. Ireland516
Friends of the Irish Environment, an environmental NGO, filed an application for judicial
review against the government of Ireland challenging the approval of the National Mitigation
Plan517 on the basis that the Plan is unconstitutional, in breach of the rights to life and an
environment consistent with human dignity,518 and is not consistent with the provisions of the
Climate Action and Low Carbon Development Act which requires the Plan to (1) specify adequate
measures to reduce GHG emissions for the purpose of attaining emission levels appropriate with
the national transition goals; and (2) take into account existing obligations under international
law.519 The applicant contends that the Plan is not sufficient to reduce GHG emissions at levels
undertaken in international agreements by Ireland.
In response, Ireland argued that the claim is therefore not justiciable because the Plan neither
confers rights nor imposes any obligations, and the court is precluded from interfering with
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government policies by virtue of separation of powers. Ireland further argued that the applicants
lack locus standi as the claim for human right breaches is made on behalf of third parties.
Decision: The Court in its judgment concluded that while the applicant had standing to
bring the rights-based claims given the constitutional and public-interest nature of the claims, the
Plan does not contravene the Climate Act and the national transition objectives, neither does it
violate human rights since the Plan is merely an initial step taken by the government towards
achieving its GHG reduction targets. According to the court, the provisions of the Plan are not
justiciable because the plan itself is the product of a discretionary exercise of power by the
government – the government had considerable discretion in preparing and approving the Plan.520
In other words, “the Plan is but one, albeit extremely important, piece of the jigsaw.”521 The Court
took the view that if the Plan is perceived to be an inadequate response, such inadequacy is not a
legal deficiency but a matter of policy with respect to which the courts cannot interfere. The
decision of the court has been appealed to the Supreme Court of Ireland.522
The right to a healthy environment: Although there is no express provision for the right
to a healthy environment in Ireland’s Constitution, the applicants place reliance on case law to
submit that there is a constitutional right to an environment consistent with human dignity.523 The
court hypothetically assumed (not necessarily agreeing with the plaintiffs) that the right to an
environment consistent with human dignity exists and went ahead to conclude that the Plan does
not place this right at risk.
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Intergenerational equity: Part of the applicant’s case is the claim that the Plan is
insufficient to “protect the world’s climate and environment for not only the current but
importantly future generations.”524 The applicants also argue that the lacunae in the plan breaches
the constitutional commitment to intergenerational solidarity and the unenumerated constitutional
obligation to vigilantly and effectively protect the environment.

5.2.4. Greenpeace Germany and Family Farmers v. Germany525
Greenpeace Germany filed a lawsuit alongside three families of farmers before the
Administrative Court of Berlin seeking to compel the German government to curb emissions in
line with its 2007 commitment to reduce its emissions by 40 percent below 1990 levels by 2020.526
The suit followed an admission by the German government that it will be unable to meet this 2020
target but would instead focus on meeting its 2030 target – reducing emissions by 55 percent below
1990 levels. The farmers alleged that their livelihoods as organic farmers are negatively impacted
by climate change. The plaintiffs therefore argued that the 2020 target is still binding and that
failure by the government to meet this 2020 target violates their constitutional rights to life &
physical integrity,527 property528 and occupational freedom.529
Germany argued that the action is not justiciable as it asks the court to interfere with the political
powers of the federal government and the exercise of executive discretion contrary to the principle
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of separation of powers. Germany further argued that no cause of action could arise from the
Climate Action Program as it is a mere executive decision for internal use.
Decision: The Court dismissed the claim on the basis that the plaintiffs lack standing
because the Climate Action Program does not impose any legal obligation on the government such
as would confer a right on any citizen - moreover, the plaintiffs failed to show actual or threatened
human rights violations peculiar to their individual selves as opposed to the general populace. In
other words, Greenpeace could not represent others since individual harm is required. The Court
also held that the plaintiffs failed to prove that their rights were violated and/or were in danger of
being violated since they were unable to show that Germany has fallen below the required
minimum level of climate protection required by law, especially since Germany was on course to
achieve 32% reduction by 2020.530 The Court however stated that the subject matter of the claim
is justiciable since it raised constitutional and public interest issues. The Court acknowledged that
there is a duty on the Government to protect fundamental human rights from the impacts of climate
change. Thus, the Court accepted that the complaint seeking climate protection is of an admissible
nature, but could not be admissible in the instant case because the plaintiffs lacked standing and
the rights of the plaintiffs are not yet compromised.531 The positive from this case seems to be that
the court for the first time in Germany accepted that fundamental rights can be violated by climate
change.532
The right to a healthy environment: the right to a healthy environment was not raised in
this case.
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Intergenerational equity: although issues regarding the rights of future generations were
not canvassed before the Court, the Court mentioned that the state has a duty to protect the
environment for future generations under the Constitution533 and as such climate protection is not
only legally required but would be anchored on fundamental rights.

5.2.5. Greenpeace Nordic Association v. The Government of Norway534
A group of environmental organisations sued the government of Norway seeking the
invalidation of ten licenses for petroleum production on the basis that the grant of these licences
violates the right to “an environment that is conducive to health and to a natural environment
whose productivity and diversity are maintained” (a healthy environment) guaranteed by the
Norwegian Constitution.535 The plaintiffs alleged that the licences permit the exploration of
undeveloped petroleum deposits thereby increasing GHG emissions, and are in a vulnerable area
adjacent to “the moveable ice edge and the polar front.”536 The Plaintiffs argued that Norway’s
international obligations under the UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol, the Paris Agreement and the ECHR
must be considered in determining if the right to a healthy environment has been violated. Thus,
Norwegian authorities must take measures to curb emissions not just of GHG emission within
Norway, but of emissions stemming from the export of oil and gas from Norway. The Defendants
argued that the rights provision relied on by the plaintiffs protects collective interests and is not a
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substantive provision that imbues any individual with any rights, and cannot be interpreted with
reference to Norway’s international obligations. Norway denies that it has any duty to curb
emissions abroad.
Decision: The Court dismissed the suit on the following grounds: (1) that emissions of CO2
abroad from oil and gas exported from Norway are irrelevant when assessing whether the Decision
violated Article 112; (2) that Norway has fulfilled the duty to take measures under Article 112;
(3)that the question of the adequacy of Norway’s climate policy is a political one and cannot be
determined by the courts; and (4) that the possible impacts from the carbon activities are too
remote.537 The plaintiffs appealed against the decision to the Court of Appeal who dismissed the
appeal and affirmed the decision of the lower Court, but however differed from the lower Court
by deciding that the emissions from petroleum products exported abroad are relevant in assessing
whether Norway has violated the right to a healthy environment.538
The right to a healthy environment: this right formed the core of the plaintiff’s argument.
The Court rejected the contention of Norway and held that article 112 is a rights provision and as
such is justiciable, even though the plaintiffs failed to prove actual or threatened violation of the
right because, in the opinion of the court, the possible impacts of GHG emissions on human rights
were too remote. The expansion of the obligations arising from this right to include prevention of
GHG emissions abroad is quite instructive.
Intergenerational equity: the Plaintiffs submitted that the rights of future generations to
a healthy environment had been violated, although not framed as an issue which the courts should
pronounce on.539 The provision for the right to a healthy environment relied on by the plaintiffs
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(as stated in their writ of summons) acknowledges that natural resources are to “be managed on
the basis of comprehensive long-term considerations which will safeguard this right for future
generations as well.”540 However, the Court of Appeal opined that the intergenerational nature of
the right to a healthy environment under Article 112 “has an aspect of the concern for democracy,
in that future generations cannot influence today’s political processes,”541 thereby highlighting the
need for representation of future generations in today’s political processes. The Court of Appeal
also stated that “the need for comprehensive consideration out of concern for future
generations…supports the application of Article 112 to the CO2 emissions from the combustion
after export as well.”542 Notably, these comments by the Court of Appeal on the interests of future
generations did not form part of the ratio decidendi of the Court of Appeal.

5.2.6. Union of Swiss Senior Women for Climate Protection v. Swiss Federal Department of
the Environment, Transport, Energy and Communications (DETEC)543
A climate organisation (an NGO) alongside four women filed a petition to DETEC544
alleging that Switzerland is not taking sufficient action to reduce its GHG emissions in view of its
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commitments under national legislation and international law to limit global temperature to at most
2°C. Whereas Switzerland set a 20 and 30% CO2 emissions reduction by 2020 and by 2030
respectively compared to 1990 levels,545 what is required to be within the global climate budget is
for Switzerland to reduce CO2 emissions by 25-40% and 50% by 2020 and 2030 respectively in
comparison to 1990 levels. The applicants highlighted the injustice of climate change to older
women, arguing that the following rights of these women were violated:546 the right to life,547 the
sustainability principle,548 the precautionary principle,549 and their rights to life, to health, and to
physical integrity under the ECHR.550
Decision: The petition to DETEC was dismissed on the ground that the fundamental rights
of the applicants were not affected individually.551 According to DETEC, the purport of the
applicants’ petition was not to protect their individual rights but to regulate CO2 emissions and
influence the lawmaking process. DETEC further stated that the applicants do not qualify as
“victims”552 for the purpose of alleging violation of the ECHR since no “sufficiently direct
connection exists between the applicant[s] and the disadvantage which has occurred or is
impending and which brought about the alleged violation, [and] persons pursuing a public interest
are excluded by this criterion.”553 The decision was upheld by the Federal Administrative Court as

illegality of such acts. The authority shall decide by way of a ruling.” See art 25a (1), Federal Act on Administrative,
1968 (Switzerland), cc172.021 (Administrative Procedure Act), [APA].
545
Switzerland, Federal Act on the Reduction of CO2 Emissions, SR 641.71, art 3 (1), [CO2 Act].
546
Request to stop omissions in climate protection pursuant to Art. 25(a) APA and Art. 6 Ziff. 1 and 13 ECHR, 25
October 2016,
547
Art 10, Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation, 1999 (Switzerland).
548
Ibid, art 73.
549
Ibid, art 74.2.
550
Art 2 and Art 8 of the ECHR.
551
DETEC cited a Federal Supreme Court case law that states that “a legal dispute exists in the case of disputes in
connection with an individual legal position worthy of protection.” See DETEC order, para 1.2.
552
Article 34 of the ECHR can only be brought in individual capacity by a “person claiming to be the victim of a
[rights] violation”. The view in this thesis is that this reasoning by the DETEC as upheld by the appellate courts seems
erroneous since the purpose of article 34 ECHR is to determine cases that can be brought before the ECtHR, and not
domestic courts or tribunals.
553
Ibid, para 2.1.

119

well as the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court, in addition to upholding DETEC’s position, stated
that the Paris Agreement cannot be said to be breached, as there is still time for the long-term goal
to be met.554
Intergenerational equity: The purpose of the Union of Swiss Senior Women for Climate
Protection is not just to protect older women but to also protect future generations. 555 However,
the petition did not rely on intergenerational equity arguments. The applicants while explaining
the sustainability principle merely cited a case where the court held that a proposed gravel mining
would make drinking water impossible for future generation among other reasons. 556 None of the
courts made any pronouncement on intergenerational equity.
The right to a healthy environment: The applicants stated although the ECHR does not
guarantee the right to a healthy environment, there is an obligation to protect from environmental
damage which is capable of negating the right to life, health, physical integrity.557 The applicants
mentioned that the Swiss constitution protects the “natural environment” as well as “people”.558
However, the court did not pronounce on the right to a healthy environment, having dismissed the
claims preliminarily.

5.2.7. Juliana v United States559
This is an action by a group of young plaintiffs (ages 8 – 19) for themselves and on behalf
of future generations against the United States seeking an order compelling the United States to

554

DETEC Supreme Court Decision, paras 5.3 & 5.4.
Request to stop omissions in climate protection pursuant to Art. 25(a) APA and Art. 6 Ziff. 1 and 13 ECHR, 25
October 2016, at 14.
556
Ibid, at 60.
557
Ibid, at 82.
558
Ibid, at 123. See Swiss Constitution, art 74.
559
Juliana v USA, No. 18-36082 D.C. No. 6:15-cv-01517- AA, Ninth Circuit.
555

120

take measures to reduce CO2 emissions to prevent increase in atmospheric CO2 beyond 350 parts
per million by 2100. According to the plaintiffs, the US has known for decades that CO2 pollution
is causing catastrophic climate change and that massive emission reductions and a nationwide
transition away from fossil fuels was needed to protect plaintiffs’ constitutional rights, yet the US
keeps allowing excessive fossil fuel production on federal public lands, subsidizing the fossil fuel
production and consumption, and supporting interstate and international transport of fossil fuels.560
The plaintiffs argue that the climate system of the United States is crucial to fulfilment of their
rights to life, liberty, property, equal protection under the law and that the United States violates
these rights as well as the public trust doctrine by permitting fossil fuel production, consumption
and combustion at dangerous levels as evidenced by several laws and policies.561
The US argued that the plaintiffs did not possess standing to maintain the suit because they had
failed to allege any particular harm attributable to acts by the US; that the plaintiffs’ claim asks
the court to interfere with the power of the federal government in violation of the doctrine of
separation of powers and the political question doctrine; and that there is no constitutional right to
be free from CO2 emissions.562
Decision: The Oregon Federal District Court held that the issue raised by the suit was not
a non-justiciable political question since the plaintiffs were asking the court to make a
pronouncement of whether or not the US by its actions has violated the plaintiffs’ constitutional
rights, a question falling “squarely within the purview of the judiciary.”563 The court concluded
that the plaintiffs had standing to sue. On further appeal to the Ninth Circuit, it was determined
that the plaintiffs did not have standing because the relief sought by the plaintiffs on its own cannot
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solve global climate change and is unlikely to redress the injuries alleged by the plaintiffs. The
Court also held that the reliefs sought by the plaintiffs fall within the purview of political questions
and are therefore not justiciable by the court. The decision was a 2-1 split decision as the dissenting
judge found that the plaintiffs have raised salient constitutional issues, shown that there is
sufficient evidence to be presented at trial and therefore possess standing to challenge the actions
of government. The plaintiffs have filed an application for rehearing of the Ninth Circuit
determination that they lacked standing. That application is pending.564
Right to a healthy environment: The District Court stated that the plaintiffs claim for
infringement of the right to a “climate system capable of sustaining human life”565 defined “[the]
right as one to be free from catastrophic climate change that will cause human deaths, shorten
human lifespans, result in widespread damage to property, threaten human food sources, and
dramatically alter the planet’s ecosystem.”566
Intergenerational equity: The rights of future generations are an integral part of the
plaintiffs’ claim. The plaintiffs institute this action on behalf of themselves as well as future
generations. The plaintiffs argued that the harm caused by the US has denied them the same
protection of fundamental rights afforded to prior and present generations of adult citizens and the
US has failed to preserve a habitable climate system for present and future generations.
The dissenting judge in the Ninth Circuit stated that notwithstanding the denial of the plaintiffs’
claims by the majority, there is hope for future generations because justice will always be done
someday; and hopefully, it will not be too late to act by the time the courts decide to accept the
injustice of climate change.567 The dissenting judge stated:
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Where is the hope in today’s decision? Plaintiffs’ claims are based on science,
specifically, an impending point of no return. If plaintiffs’ fears, backed by the
government’s own studies, prove true, history will not judge us kindly. When the seas
envelop our coastal cities, fires and droughts haunt our interiors, and storms ravage
everything between, those remaining will ask: Why did so many do so little?568
In other words, the dissenting judge decried the majority decision because it was, among other
reasons, detrimental to the rights of future generations. The dissenting judge did not despair with
regard to the likelihood that the rights of future generations will be recognised, but rather expressed
optimism that the rights of future generations will be recognised in the nearest future.

5.3. Summary
The major challenges to the human rights-based climate suits are establishing standing and
justiciability, and proving violation of human rights. It is observed the theoretical question of
individuality discussed in chapter two of this thesis is also an integral question in these cases. An
observation with respect to the intergenerational equity components in these cases is that plaintiffs
and courts seem to mostly employ the principle as an interpretative aid and do not attribute rights
to future generations. It is also observed that most of the cases are against the State and not private
corporations. These issues are addressed in the next chapter of this thesis.
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Chapter Six: Challenges to the Human Rights Approach and the Rights of Future
Generations in Climate Litigation
This chapter examines the challenges to the human rights approach to climate litigation. It also
examines the challenges to recognition of the rights of future generations in climate cases. The
chapter begins with an overview of the human rights and intergenerational equity approaches to
climate litigation. Thereafter, the issues arising from standing, proving violation, rights-based
climate cases against private corporations, and measuring the success of rights-based climate
litigation are examined.

6.1. Overview of the Human Rights and Intergenerational Equity Approaches to Climate
Change Litigation
Human rights, even if recognized, are not self-enforcing and therefore constitute the basis of
special categories of possible court cases.569 As evident from the preceding chapter, where States
have failed to address human rights concerns arising from climate change, a movement of human
rights cases in multiple courts world-wide has been initiated as an alternative in order to balance
the power of the legislative and executive.570 The human rights approach to climate litigation
consists of cases where climate-unfriendly acts and omissions are framed as violations of
fundamental human rights such as the right to a good environment, right to life, the right to health,
the right to dignity of human person. These cases are mostly instituted by individuals and advocacy
groups before domestic courts, with a few being instituted in a regional court (ECtHR). The cases
are typically brought against governments, although there seems to be an emerging trajectory of

569

Joyeeta Gupta, “Litigation, Human Rights and Climate Change”, Global Policy (25 November 2015), online: <
https://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/25/11/2015/litigation-human-rights-and-climate-change>, [Gupta].
570
Ibid.

124

human right cases against corporations.571 Human rights-based arguments in climate litigation
have been used in two ways – the first is the recognition of human right violations related to climate
change as a cause of action in its own right, while the second way is the use of human rights as an
interpretative tool for determining whether defendants are in breach of certain statutory obligations
imposed on them.572
The intergenerational equity approach to climate litigation involves putting forward
arguments that the rights of future generations have been violated by climate change. The decision
in Urgenda v Netherlands in 2015 did not only signify the advent of the human rights approach to
climate litigation but also the intergenerational equity approach. Following the Urgenda case,
there has been a wave of climate cases by and on behalf of children, youth, future generations and
other citizens in the form of lawsuits, petitions and complaints against several governments across
the globe.573 These cases bring intergenerational equity perspectives into the human rights
approach to climate litigation by arguing that climate change affects the rights of not just the
present generations, but also the rights of future generations. These cases highlight the injustice of
climate change to children, young persons and future generations since they are more fragile,
largely do not participate in the decision-making process, have a longer period of time to be on the
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planet, and bear the responsibility of repairing the damage done by the present generation. The
young litigants in these cases challenge government (in)actions and policies on climate change on
the basis that such actions and policies violate international climate agreements and human rights
obligations. The litigants in these cases attribute human rights to future generations such as the
right to life, right to health, right to a healthy environment and other rights typically impacted by
climate change. The courts have in some of these cases accepted arguments attributing rights to
future generations, while rejecting such arguments in other cases. The practical challenges to
enforcing the right of future generations through litigation include standing (who would bring the
cases on behalf of future generations), difficulty in proving violation, the transboundary nature of
climate change, and the absence of a legal framework for recognizing the rights of future
generations.

6.2. The Problem of Standing
Human rights-based climate lawsuits have often been brought by NGOs, civil societies, and
individuals. One of the most significant challenges faced by plaintiffs in the climate lawsuits is
establishing standing. The standing of the plaintiffs has always been in contention in virtually all
the human right-based climate cases. There are two grounds on which standing of the plaintiffs is
usually challenged – firstly, that the nature of the subject matter renders it nonjusticiable; and
secondly, that plaintiffs do not possess the capacity to maintain the suit (regardless of the fact that
the claims are justiciable in nature).
The major argument of defendants with respect to non-justiciability of the subject matter in
rights-based climate lawsuits is that climate change is a policy issue requiring the exercise of
discretion by the government and any interference by the judiciary is a violation of the doctrine of
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separation of powers. The reason for this argument is that the policy documents containing
governments’ plans to address climate change are often not justiciable.574 From the cases
examined, a majority of the courts seem to agree that the plaintiffs do not have standing on this
ground. There are also courts that decide otherwise. The decisions of the courts in ENJEU575 and
Greenpeace Germany576 are quite instructive in this regard. The court in both cases examined the
justiciability issue using a constitutional lens. While the court in ENJEU found that the suit was
justiciable since all government powers must be exercised in line with the constitution, the court
in Greenpeace Germany similarly found that the plaintiffs’ claim was justiciable because it raised
constitutional and public interest issue. Thus, the use of a constitutional lens can be very helpful
for the courts to determine whether an action is justiciable.577 The fact that a claim raises political
questions should not in itself defeat the competence of that action. The relevant test here ought to
be – whether the plaintiff’s claims affect constitutional rights or raise public interest issues?. If the
courts in Greenpeace Nordic, Juliana, FIE, had adopted this test, they likely would have reached
a conclusion that the plaintiffs had standing. It is worthy of note that the dissenting judge raised
this test in Juliana, resolved it in the affirmative and reached a conclusion that the plaintiffs had
standing.578 Regrettably, the grant of standing to the plaintiffs did not suffice to sustain the ENJEU
and Greenpeace Germany lawsuits as the courts dismissed them on other grounds – the
arbitrariness of the class represented; and that the rights were yet to be compromised respectively.
An issue arising with respect to capacity of the plaintiffs is the requirement for proof of
individual interest as opposed to collective interests. In a number of the rights-based cases
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discussed in this thesis, the courts have held that plaintiffs must show that the claims put forward
peculiarly affect them in their individual capacities rather than merely showing the claims affect
them generally as well as many others (and even everyone). It is therefore evident that the
individuality argument is not just a theoretical issue but translates into a practical issue. This
requirement of individuality is particularly raised by defendants in rights-based climate cases in
EU courts, because of the provisions of the ECHR579 permitting the ECtHR to receive applications
only from individuals, as well as the provisions of the TFEU580 permitting individual actions by
natural persons only in cases where legislative acts are of “direct and individual concern to
them.”581 The courts in Carvalho582 and DETEC583 relied on these provisions to arrive at a decision
that the plaintiffs lacked standing, having failed to show that the actions of government being
challenged affected them individually over and above other citizens. The court in Greenpeace
Germany also reached a similar conclusion while rejecting the plaintiffs’ standing. However, the
courts in Urgenda and Future Generations rejected the defendants’ arguments that the plaintiffs
were not affected individually. While the court in Urgenda rejected the individuality argument on
the basis that the provision of article 34 of the ECHR only applies to the ECtHR and not domestic
courts, the court in Future Generations rejected it on the basis of an expansive interpretation of
human rights to include protection of non-human species and future generations. The decision of
the court in Future Generations, which was based on an ecocentric-anthropic view of the
579
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environment, aligns with the feminist relational theory. This decision is therefore an indication
that the feminist relational theory provides an answer not just to the theoretical questions, but also
provides a practical answer to the individuality question in rights-based climate cases. It is
therefore important for climate litigants to put forward this argument in court, and for the courts
to accept this reconceptualization of human rights.
An issue on standing specifically touching on the rights of future generations is the question
of who can bring an action on behalf of future generations. Defendants often argue against the
grant of standing to future generations on the ground that future generations do not possess rights
since they are not in existence, for example, the government of Ontario in Marthur (which is
pending) is arguing against the standing of the plaintiffs to represent the rights of future
generations.584 Generally, the courts often seem to make implicit references to rights of future
generations in human-rights based cases by way of obiter dicta. There is therefore a dearth of
binding pronouncements on the issue of standing on behalf of future generations. Perhaps this is
due to the fact that the plaintiffs seldom frame the interests of future generations as a right in itself
or make the rights of future generations an integral issue in these cases. It is therefore important
for climate litigants to canvass the rights of future generations more directly, especially as the
courts appear to be receptive to the concept of intergenerational equity, albeit on a peripheral scale.
Although a majority of the rights-based cases are not framed with the rights of future generations
as a key issue, the few cases with such framing seem to have had mixed outcomes. In Urgenda,
the court took the view that the plaintiffs possess standing to defend interests of future generations
due to the principle of sustainable development, while the court in Juliana (with the exception of
the dissent) found that the plaintiffs do not have standing to bring the action on behalf of future
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generations. Another instructive point on standing can be found in the decision of the court in
Minors Oposa (discussed in chapter 3).585 The court in Minors Oposa found that the plaintiffs
possessed standing to maintain the case on behalf of future generations on the basis of
intergenerational equity. The court in Minors Oposa stated thus:
We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their
generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue
on behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology
is concerned… Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to
preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful
ecology. Put a little differently, the minors’ assertion of their right to a sound
environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure
the protection of that right for the generations to come.586
Thus, the grant of standing to future generations by the court can be based on the concept of
intergenerational equity and the principle of sustainable development. The court therefore plays a
key role in the recognition of standing for future generations.
Apart from the courts, there are other mechanisms for protecting the rights of future
generations which can be pivotal to the recognition of standing for future generations. The court
in Greenpeace Nordic highlighted the need for future generations to be represented in today’s
democratic process.587 This representation could be achieved by the appointment of ombudsmen
to protect the rights of future generations. The establishment of ombudsmen (or commissioners)
for rights of future generations could address the issue of standing.588 Ombudsmen are typically
appointed by the government to protect the interests of particular groups by advising the
government, evaluating policies, serving as liaisons between the government and the groups, and
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taking other steps necessary for protection of the group such as commencing legal actions to
protect the group.589 Examples of ombudsmen dealing with sustainable development include the
U.K. Sustainable Development Commission, Canadian Commissioner of the Environment and
Sustainable Development, and environmental ombudsmen in some states in the US.590 It has been
suggested that this ombudsman model could be useful for future generations. Also, there are
examples of committees that serve as ombudsmen such as the Inter-ministerial Committee on the
Sustainable Development Goals in Nigeria; the Parliamentary Advisory Council on Sustainable
Development in Germany, the inter-ministerial committee on Sustainable Consumption and
Production in Chile.591 It is important to mention that some countries have already established
ombudsmen specifically for the purpose of protecting the rights of future generations. Examples
include Hungary’s Parliamentary Commissioner for Future Generations, the Committee for the
Future in Finland, and the Commissioner for Future Generations in Wales.592
Yet another innovative solution (perhaps an interim one) to the problem of lack of standing
could be using the rights of the child as a medium for enforcing the rights of future generations.
This is the strategy adopted by the youth and children petitioners in Sacchi v Argentina & others593.
This is a petition bright before the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child by sixteen
children from different countries against Argentina, Brazil, France, Germany and Turkey, which
are some of the countries that have ratified the Optional Protocol to the Child Rights Convention.594
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The petitioners argue that these countries have knowingly caused the current climate crisis by their
refusal to reduce emissions at the “highest possible ambition”595 consistent with keeping global
warming under the 1.5C and 2.0 targets – i.e. if all nations of the world were to adopt the similar
proportion of emissions as these countries. The petitioners also argue that these countries have
condoned the pollution by other major GHG emitting countries in spite of legal, diplomatic and
economic tools available to ensure reduction in global emissions that aligns with the global
emissions reduction requirements under international climate law. The petitioners therefore submit
that these countries are not living up to their obligation to respect, protect and fulfill the rights of
the child, as climate has adversely affected and continues to affect children’s rights to life, health,
culture, and development – the action by these countries indicate that the best interests of the child
are not of paramount consideration in their climate actions and strategies as required by the
CRC.596 The petitioners argue that this petition constitutes an exception to the requirement under
the Optional Protocol to the CRC on a Communications Procedure (OPIC) that all domestic
remedies must be exhausted before a petition is brought to the CRC597 due to the transnational
nature of the human right violations, the impracticability of separate suits by the respective
petitioners, and the non-justiciability of the issues raised in the case in their respective domestic
dispute resolution forums. The petitioners emphasize the impacts of climate change not just on
children but on future generations. The same rights of the child (allegedly breached by these
governments) are attributed to future generations. The petitioners distil a “duty to ensure
intergenerational equity for children and future generations” from the human rights obligations
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under international environmental and climate law.598 It is important to note however that the right
to a healthy environment was not canvassed in this case. This is perhaps due to the absence of an
express right to a healthy environment under the CRC as well as under international law more
broadly. The petitioners however referenced the IACHR opinion stating that all human rights
depend on the existence of a healthy environment.599 Brazil, France and Germany objected to the
petition, stating that it was inadmissible on three grounds: (1) the CRC lacks jurisdiction; (2) the
petition is manifestly ill-founded or unsubstantiated; and 3) petitioners have not exhausted
domestic remedies. Although the petition is still pending before the CRC, the lesson from this
petition is that the legal framework for rights of the child holds some potential for climate litigation
on behalf of future generations. The OHCHR suggests this approach in one of its reports.600

6.3. The Challenge of Proving Violation
A major hurdle for plaintiffs in rights-based litigation is the difficulty in proving violation
of the rights. In most of the cases where courts granted the plaintiffs standing or held that a claim
is justiciable, the courts have gone on to decide that the plaintiffs are unable to prove violation of
their human rights. An example is FIE where the court found that although the plaintiffs had
standing to maintain the suit, they were unable to show that the climate policies put in place by
government violated their human rights.601 Other examples are Greenpeace Germany602 and
Greenpeace Nordic603 wherein the courts upheld the justiciability of the claims, but dismissed the
claims on the basis that the plaintiffs’ rights were yet to be violated. The Court in DETEC took a
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similar position by stating that the Paris Agreement cannot be argued to have been breached since
there is still time for the long-term targets therein to be achieved.604
One reason for the challenge in proving violation in rights-based climate cases is because
human right violations are more easily established after harm has occurred, whereas the adverse
impacts of climate change are mostly futuristic projections.605 It has been observed that “courts are
generally not equipped to deal with predictions of future injuries, except where the harm is
expected to be quite imminent.”606 As discussed in chapter four of this thesis, this approach
represents the presentist approach of the human rights framework. This futuristic nature of climate
change could be addressed by an intergenerational perspective whereby future generations are
granted human rights. Since the rights sought to be protected would include those of future
generations, the problem of the injuries and violations being too futuristic will not arise.
Another reason for the difficulty in proving violation is the challenge in determining the
standards against which to decide whether or not climate action or inaction violates human rights,
i.e. what exactly does a State need to do (or not do) in order not to be in violation of the human
rights of the citizens? Since States are usually already executing climate action plans and
implementing climate action policies, the question then becomes whether such steps taken by a
State are adequate. One way of measuring the adequacy of steps is to look at the national plans
and policies themselves to determine if the States are implementing them to the fullest extent.
However, this method of determining standards may not be useful where the court is unwilling to
test the adequacy of the policy but rather decides to leave the determination of the standard to the
discretion of the government.607 Another way to determine the standards is to look at commitments
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a State has made under international climate agreements, particularly the NDCs under the Paris
Agreement. Where a State is found not to meet its targets under these agreements, some courts
have held that the State is not doing enough to curb climate change. 608 Some other courts have
taken the view that individuals cannot take the benefit of these agreements as the agreements are
between States.609 Another issue arising is that a State may enter into an agreement which cannot
realistically meet the global temperature targets of 1.5oC/2oC, since the NDCs are voluntary. In
such instances, plaintiffs have resorted to scientific reports stipulating the ideal contributions each
State ought to make if the global goal is to be achieved.610 Climate science is therefore very key
towards measuring the adequacy of commitment by States.611 It must be noted however that it is
easier to establish causation in respect of failure of government to take adaptation measures than
for failure to mitigate.612
The difficulty in proving violation of rights also arises in cases alleging transboundary
violation of human rights. Proving transboundary violation of human rights is problematic because
of the challenge of linking a particular harm to climate change, attributing particular emissions to
particular emitters, and linking particular emitters and victims.613 While there is concrete scientific
evidence apportioning responsibility for climate change, these scientific studies are yet to attribute
particular impacts of climate change to particular States. Scientific studies only go as far as
attributing collective responsibility for climate change impacts to the emitting States and Carbon
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Majors. This is one of the reasons the IACHR refused the 2005 petition.614 This problem could be
addressed using Knox’s suggestion that responsibility should be apportioned to States on the basis
of their emissions, rather than on the basis of harm.615 Knox states that “it is not necessary to link
the emissions of a particular state to a particular harm in order to assign responsibility for the
harm”616 and therefore suggests that “since all greenhouse gases contribute to climate change,
wherever they are released, responsibility could be allocated according to states’ shares of global
emissions of greenhouse gases.”617 This is without prejudice to the climate justice principle of
Common But Differentiated Responsibility under which a State “with GHG emissions close to the
permissible quantum” may be permitted to emit GHG within the “permissible quantum” if doing
so would avert “undue hardship, considering, in particular, the country’s historical GHG
contributions, its capabilities in terms of its wealth, its needs, its dependence on fossil fuel, and its
access to renewable energy.”618
As mentioned in chapters two and three of this thesis, the recognition of the right to a healthy
environment will to a large extent relieve the plaintiffs of the burden of proving causation since
any harm done to the environment itself will suffice. It does not seem merely coincidental that
courts tend not to accept inadequate climate action as a violation of human rights in cases where
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the right to a healthy environment is not accepted or not considered by the court,619 while the courts
seem more disposed to accept inadequate climate action as a violation or threat to human rights
human rights of the plaintiffs where they accept the right to a healthy environment. This is not to
say that the acceptance of the right to a healthy environment by the court automatically translates
to acceptance of violation of rights620 – for instance, the court in Greenpeace Nordic621 accepted
the existence of the right to a healthy environment but found that there was no actual or threatened
violation of the plaintiffs’ human rights.622 The important thing to note here is that a common
denominator in all cases where the court accepted human-rights violation arguments in rightsbased climate suits is the acceptance of the right to a healthy environment by the courts.623 In fact,
in cases where the right is not recognised as a substantive right, the court drew out the right from
other human rights such as the rights to life, health, property, and equality.624 Therefore, an
important factor for the success of rights-based climate cases is the progressive interpretation by
the courts towards accepting the rights to a healthy environment.
It should be noted that rights-based climate litigation has been more successful in the Global
South than it has been in the Global North. For example, five out of the six cases625 resolved in
favour of the plaintiffs are all decisions in the Global South. Setzer and Benjamin note that this
success in the Global South could possibly be due to the presence of express constitutional
provisions protecting the environment in these jurisdictions, as well as the willingness of the courts
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to accept rights framing of climate cases.626 Apart from the existence of the right to a healthy
environment, other factors relevant to acceptance of rights-based climate cases include the
existence of substantive and procedural law for enhancing rights claims and judicial receptivity to
these rights framing.627

6.4. Possibility of Rights-Based Actions against Private corporations
There have been climate cases against private corporations. However, most of these cases
have been on the basis of tort law, with almost no rights-based climate cases. This dearth of rightsbased climate cases against private corporations has attracted commentary from climate law
scholars and practitioners. Targeting private corporations with climate suits is important due to the
significant contribution by these corporations to GHG emissions.628 Also, actions against private
corporations would obviate the questions of standing in relation to separation of powers and
political discretion typically raised by governments in climate cases. The commencement of
climate actions against private corporations has been identified as a remarkable development that
would be valuable to the human rights approach to climate change.629 It has also been observed
that the role of private law in climate litigation has been neglected, in spite of the potential of
regulation of conducts of non-state actors and climate litigation against private corporations to
shape climate policies.630 Sadly, there remains a dearth of rights-based cases against private
corporation. Virtually all the rights-based climate cases are against the government, and not private
corporations. Only one out of the thirteen cases examined in the preceding chapter is against a
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private corporation – the case of Gbemre against Shell Nigeria. It is also worthy of mention that
Milieudefensie, Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth alongside other environmental NGOs have sued
Shell before the Hague District in the Netherlands arguing that Shell’s contributions to GHG
emissions violates the human rights to life and dignity of human person protected under the Dutch
Civil Code and the ECHR.631 The plaintiffs seek to compel Shell to reduce its GHG emissions in
line with the global temperature target within the climate regime.632 The arguments in the case are
reminiscent of the arguments put forward by the plaintiffs in Urgenda – except that this time the
arguments are directly against a private corporation, rather than the government.
This dearth of cases against private corporations has been attributed to the preoccupation of
international human rights regime with regulation of states (not corporations or individuals), issues
of sovereignty in apportioning transboundary responsibility633 and the fact that private
corporations are not parties to international agreements.634 However, the duty of States to “protect”
human rights at the domestic level entails an obligation on States not to permit private actors within
their jurisdiction to carry out activities that would violate human rights of individuals and groups,
and to provide remedies for such violations.635 Within the scope of this duty, one of the
mechanisms through which the State protects human rights and provides remedies to victims of
breach is through the courts (effective adjudication)636. Thus, individuals are able to hold private
corporations accountable for breaches of human rights on the basis of domestic human rights
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instruments. Additionally, there is an increasing recognition of obligations of private corporations
towards human rights within the international human rights framework as evident in the UN
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, 2011 (UNGPBHR).637 The UNGBPHR has
three pillars: the state duty to protect human rights, the corporate responsibility to respect human
rights and access to remedies. Although the UNGBPHR is a soft law instrument, it is increasingly
being relied on by individuals in an attempt to hold private corporations accountable for breach of
human rights vis-à-vis climate change. For example, the plaintiffs in Milieudefensie rely on the
UNGBPHR as well as other legal instruments to argue that Shell has an obligation to respect
human rights.638 Another remarkable development with respect to the UNGBPHR is a petition to
the Commission of the Human Rights of the Philippines (CHR) by Greenpeace Southeast Asia
alongside other civil societies against 50 companies (mostly carbon majors), in which the CHR
was asked to investigate the responsibility of the carbon majors for human rights violations and
for threats of violations resulting from the impacts of climate change in the Philippines.639 The
petitioners heavily relied on the provisions of the UNGBPHR to establish the obligations on the
Carbon Majors. One of the key facts relied on by the petitioners is scientific research reports
apportioning responsibility for anthropogenic GHG emissions to each of the Carbon Majors since
1751.640 The CHR after thorough investigations and a series of hearings, reached a conclusion that
the carbon majors are “legally and morally liable for human rights harms to Filipinos resulting
from climate change.”641 Although the decision of the CHR is not binding, it represents a major
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stride in the private law trajectory of rights-based climate litigation and could influence similar
actions in other States.642 It is therefore important for climate litigants to start bringing suits against
private corporations relying on both domestic and international human rights instruments
applicable to non-state entities.
It must be noted however that the use of a human rights approach in climate litigation against
private corporations may face challenges similar to the tortious approach, for example, the use of
Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs) to intimidate and silence climate
organizations and activists, in regions where there are no anti-SLAPP laws.643 There are also
concerns that climate litigation targeted at carbon major multinational corporations could compel
the corporations to close up shop in States or could cause the States to start granting corporations
some sort of immunity.644

6.5. Measuring the success of Rights-based Climate Litigation
An important issue to be considered with respect to rights-based climate litigation is how to
measure the success rate of the cases in order to ascertain whether or not litigation is indeed an
effective tool for compelling climate action. In other words, what are the parameters for
determining whether a climate case is successful? This importance of this question is underlined
by the fact that cases with judgment awarded in favour of plaintiffs may not be enforced, while
cases decided against the plaintiffs could still compel climate action. According to Bouwer,
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“success in these [climate] cases requires a nuanced understanding of victory and defeat, and more
careful thinking about the character, aims, and effect of these pieces of litigation.”645 More
generally, law and social change scholars have observed that whether litigation “works” or not
cannot be assessed solely by the court’s pronouncement and compliance thereto - for instance,
litigation that receives widespread attention (whether resolved in favour of the plaintiffs or not)
has the potential to raise public consciousness, put an issue on the political agenda, stimulate
political activity by revealing the vulnerability of structural arrangements that seem impervious to
change, and amplify the threat of litigation costs being imposed if decision makers fail to find
political solutions.646 Therefore, one has to look beyond the legalese in the court pronouncements
to see the real impact these cases are having on climate action.647 For example, the court in Leghari
(which is one of the celebrated rights-based cases) in post-judgment proceedings confirmed that
government had complied with the Leghari decision at least until January 2017. However, the
Pakistani government appears to have slacked in its efforts as another case has recently been filed
by a group of women on behalf of themselves and future generations on the ground that the
Pakistani Government has failed to take necessary steps in protecting the climate since December
2017.648 Another example is the decision of the Colombian Supreme Court in Future Generations
with which the Colombian government is yet to comply.649 Example of cases resolved against the
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plaintiffs but which could be said to bear favourable outcomes include ENJEU where the court
agreed with the plaintiffs that the human right violation claims put forward by the plaintiffs were
justiciable in spite of dismissing the suit on grounds that the plaintiffs failed to meet the procedural
requirement for maintaining the claims by way of a class action. The court’s pronouncement that
the plaintiffs did not have to bring the claims by way of a class action implies that the court is
likely to accept the plaintiffs’ claims if the claim is brought for themselves. The insight from this
case would be impactful for plaintiffs if they decide to refile the suit and for subsequent rightsbased climate cases in Canada. Similarly, the impacts of the Inuit petition are very far-reaching
despite the dismissal of the petition by the IACHR.650 The petition was the earliest case seeking to
establish a link between climate change and human rights, and therefore sparked global interest in
the nexus between climate change and human rights.651 Bratspies notes that “if success is measured
by legal outcome, the Inuit petition was a failure, [however] to dismiss it as a failed litigation
strategy would be to miss the pivotal role this petition played in elucidating the connection between
human rights and climate change.”652 Thus, even cases resolved by the courts against plaintiffs
may provide guidance for “climate change responsive adjudication in the longer term.”653 Peel and
Osofsky’s view on the impact of rights-based climate litigation is worthy of note:
Of course, court victories are not the only measure of ‘success’ for litigation brought
with the strategic purpose of promoting social and policy change with through the
ways in which they shape public dialogue, business attitudes and government action.
Although alleging rights violations in climate cases may not result in formally
successful judgments, they may nevertheless garner media and public attention that
elevate political discussions about climate change, highlight the plight of particular
communities, bring to light mitigation or adaptation failures, and ultimately illuminate
the ‘human face’ of climate disaster. In the final analysis, the strongest benefit from a
turn towards rights arguments in climate change litigation may stem from these
650
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informal effects and the role they play in re-orienting and reframing the climate debate
to one that emphasizes impacts on people. Such framing may ultimately prove to be
more publicly and politically salient than scientific and technical arguments in
motivating strong action to address the problem.654
This is not to say that there are no cases where the decision of the court was implemented.
An example is the Himachal Pradesh case where (following the decision of the NGT), the State
government of Himachal began to put measures in place to curb the black carbon emission
including introduction of eco-friendly buses,655 banning of vehicles older than 15 years old,656
among other measures. The State Government has been providing periodic updates to the NGT,
although the NGT had on an occasion expressed dissatisfaction with the progress made so far.657
Another issue arising from examining the impact of rights-based climate cases is the predominant
focus on the high-profile cases658 such as Urgenda, Leghari, Future Generations, Juliana. The
focus on the high-profile cases seems to present a narrative that there is an overwhelming
acceptance of rights-based arguments by the court, whereas the contrary can be said to be the case.
Out of the thirteen cases examined in the previous chapter, six cases were resolved in favour of
the plaintiffs, while the remaining seven were dismissed. Savaresi notes that only about a quarter
of the climate cases involving human right arguments have been successful.659 Admittedly, the
high-profile cases have propelled the recent rights-based approach to climate litigation. However,
the focus on the high- profile successful cases does not tell the full story of the success of rights-
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based climate cases. A wholistic analysis of the rights-based cases is therefore imperative so as to
identify the areas of weaknesses. Examining the outcomes of climate litigation has been identified
as a new trajectory for scholarship on climate litigation.660

6.6. Summary
It is important for the courts to adopt a constitutional test in determining whether an action falls
outside the scope of justiciability. The relevant question ought to be whether the claims raise
constitutional issues and threaten human rights. It ought not to matter whether the claims involve
matters in respect of which the State has discretion. Also, the feminist relational theory provides a
way of reconceptualising human rights to the effect that the question of existence of individual
harm would become insignificant. With respect to future generations, the challenge of standing
with respect to future generations can be addressed by creation of ombudsmen for future
generations. Recognition of the right of future generations to a healthy environment and attribution
of responsibility for GHG emissions to States on basis of emissions (historical and present), could
address the problem of proving violation. This chapter has highlighted the potential for
commencement of human rights-based climate suits against private corporations for violation of
human rights, and the need for establishment of standards to measure the success of rights-based
climate litigation.
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Chapter Seven: Conclusion
This chapter provides a summary of the discussions in preceding chapters and ultimately
highlights recommendations for addressing issues arising from the human rights approach to
climate change as it relates to intergenerational equity and climate litigation.

7.1. Summary
The focus of this thesis is to appraise the human rights approach to climate change litigation,
particularly as it relates to intergenerational equity and the right to a healthy environment. The
thesis examines how the concept of intergenerational equity fits within the human rights approach
to climate change litigation. The thesis begins by examining the human rights approach to climate
change. It undertakes an overview of the legal framework for the human rights approach to climate
change in order to determine the laws and instruments forming the basis of the human rights
approach under international environmental, human rights and climate law. The UDHR, ICCPR,
ICESCR, UNDRIP, UNCRC are some of the major international human rights instruments
supporting the human rights approach to climate litigation. An important point to note regarding
the international human law instruments is the absence of an express right to a healthy
environment. The thesis recognises that the regional human rights instruments and national
constitutions are essential to the human rights approach to climate litigation, especially as the right
to a healthy environment are recognised in some of the regional instruments and national
constitutions. The Stockholm Declaration, Rio Declaration and the UNSDGs are identified as
some of the key international environmental law instruments relevant to the human rights approach
to climate change. It is observed that these international environmental law instruments are soft
law instruments which in themselves are not binding, but could become binding once they
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unarguably attain the status of customary international law.661 Within the international climate law
framework, the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol, the 2009 Copenhagen Accord, the 2010 Cancun
Agreement and the Paris Agreement are the main instruments relevant to the human rights
approach to climate change. However, these international law instruments do not emphasize a
human rights approach to climate change.
The OHCHR has contributed significantly towards the clarifying the relationship between
human rights and climate change. Following the work of the OHCHR, this thesis has outlined a
number of human rights affected by climate change. Such rights include the rights to life, health,
food, water, a healthy environment as well as the rights of the child and other vulnerable groups.
The right to a healthy environment is essential to the human rights approach to climate change due
to the fact that this right presents the most direct linkages (compared to other human rights)
between climate change and human rights. However, this right is yet to be recognised under
international law and by some States (although the majority of States recognise this right). The
reasons for the non-recognition of the right to a healthy environment are to a large extent
theoretical. The thesis therefore attempts to provide theoretical justifications for the right to a
healthy environment using existing human right theories. The Western Liberal theories namely the
natural law theory, will theory and interest theory, which are the traditional human right theories,
lay down the criteria to be met for a right to qualify as a human right. These criteria are
individuality, independence and dignity. The right to a healthy environment does not meet the
criteria for recognition of human rights laid down by these theories.662 It is therefore concluded
that these theories do not provide justifications for the recognition of the right to a healthy
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environment. The thesis proposes the feminist theory of relational autonomy and the corporeal
citizenship theory as alternative theories that provide justification for recognition of the right to a
healthy environment. The relational autonomy theory and the corporeal citizenship theory
emphasize the need to examine the human rights and the environment as being one and the same.
In other words, the human being is not seen as being detached from the environment. Thus, any
harm to the environment constitutes simultaneous harm to the human person. This thesis
emphasizes the need for recognition of the right to a healthy environment and the benefits of such
recognition to the human rights approach to climate change. The benefits of the human rights
approach to climate change are its focus on humans as victims, the moral force of human rights,
its ability to provide innovative legal mechanisms to address climate change, its emphasis on
vulnerable groups such as children, future generations, indigenous people and women. The thesis
also critiques arguments against recognition of the right to a healthy environment. Overall, the
thesis concludes that the right to a healthy environment is vital to the success of the human rights
approach to tackling climate change, and is important for rights-based climate cases.
The thesis examines the concept of intergenerational equity and identifies its status within
the human rights approach to climate change. The thesis examines the extent to which
intergenerational equity is recognised under international law i.e. under international
environmental law, climate change law, human rights law. The conclusion is that intergenerational
equity is mostly contained in preambular provisions of international law instruments as an
aspirational or guiding principle. It is observed that framings of interests of future generation
within these instruments are not rights-focused. In other words, the instruments do not expressly
attribute human rights to future generations. The theoretical difficulties in recognizing the rights
of future generations are discussed. It is however concluded that these difficulties are not
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unsurmountable as States have started granting rights to future generations in their national
constitutions. The importance of the intergenerational equity approach to the human rights
approach to climate change includes its compatibility with the human rights approach which
emphasizes protection of rights of vulnerable groups, its de-emphasis on presentism,663 its
contribution to the protection of the rights of the child against climate change, its potential to define
the concept of sustainable development and to provide a justification for the right to a healthy
environment.
An examination of the decisions of the courts on human rights-based cases reveals that the
arguments of plaintiffs in a preponderance of human rights-based climate cases have been rejected
by the courts. It also reveals that the interests of future generation are not framed in rights language,
rather intergenerational equity serves an explanatory function for the plaintiffs and is used as an
interpretative aid by the courts. Upon a case-by-case analysis of the human rights climate cases,
the conclusion is that the theoretical problems associated with the human rights approach to
climate change and protection of interests of future generations also exist in various forms in
climate litigation. These theoretical problems translate to issues such as difficulty in establishing
standing, justiciability and violation in climate litigation. This is the reason it is important that
these questions be approached both theoretically and practically. If the issues can be addressed
theoretically, they are unlikely to pose as much problems practically, and vice versa. Another
observation is that the human rights-based cases are mostly against States, and not private
corporations. It has also been noted in this thesis that there is little or no discourse on how to
measure the success of human rights-based climate litigation.
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7.2. Recommendations
In light of the issues identified in this thesis, the following recommendations are made:
7.2.1. International Recognition of the Right to a Healthy Environment
It is clear that one of the issues identified in the human rights approach to climate change
is the absence of a right to a healthy environment.664 The absence of this right also makes it difficult
for plaintiffs to establish violation of their rights in human rights-based climate litigation. Thus,
one of the first steps towards advancing the human rights approach to climate litigation is the
recognition of the right to a healthy environment. This right should be included in international
law instruments and fully recognized as customary international law. The draft of the Global Pact
for the Environment (draft GPE) is an example of an international law instrument that contains a
characterization of the right to a healthy environment — “Every person has the right to live in an
ecologically sound environment adequate for their health, well-being, dignity, culture and
fulfilment.”665 The draft GPE is currently under consideration at the UNGA and is being discussed
between States.666 The absence of the right to a healthy environment can also be addressed at future
earth summits.667
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<https://www.cigionline.org/publications/not-all-glitters-gold-analysis-global-pact-environment-project>,
[SaintGeniès]. The GPE will apply to environmental protection as a whole regardless of the area (climate, biodiversity,
pollution, and others). It has been argued however that the importance of the GPE may be exaggerated and could be
counter-productive. See Saint-Geniè, ibid.
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Towards a Global Pact for the Environment, UN Doc A/RES/71/277, UNGAOR, 72nd session (2018).
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Past summits include the Rio Summit 1992, and the Rio+20 Conference 2012.
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7.2.2. Constitutionalizing the Right to a Healthy Environment in National Laws
Due to the superiority of the constitution to other laws in a State, it is important that the
right to a healthy environment is constitutionalised. In jurisdictions where human rights provisions
in the constitution are applied to human right violations by private entities, this will not only
address inaction by the State but also acts of violation by private entities. For jurisdictions where
human rights provisions in the constitution do not apply to non-state entities, it is important that
the right is enshrined in human right laws that apply to non-state entities.

7.2.3. Direct Inclusion of Human Rights in Climate Law Instruments.
It is important for climate law instruments to go beyond mere inclusion of human rights
linkages to climate change in preambular provisions. The duties of States to respect, protect and
fulfil human rights have to be part of the substantive provisions in climate law instruments, so that
climate action can be undertaken with these duties as paramount considerations. However, it is
unlikely that the Paris Agreement or the UNFCCC can be amended due to controversies with
including human rights provisions during the negotiations in climate instruments as evidenced for
instance by the Paris Agreement negotiations.668 Another option may be to create a further climate
change document at international level to address the human rights concerns – this option is
however hampered by the controversy that has trailed the human rights provisions of the Paris
Agreements.

668

See Geneva Negotiating Text, supra note 350; Benoit Mayer, “Human Rights in the Paris Agreement”, (2016) 6
Climate Law 109-117.
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7.2.4. Reconceptualization of Human Rights using the Feminist Theory of Relational
Autonomy
One of the recurring themes in this thesis is the lack of theoretical framework supporting
the human rights approach to climate change. The feminist theory of relational autonomy presents
a way of reconceptualizing the theoretical underpinning of human rights to accommodate climate
change as a violation of human rights not just of the present generations, but also of future
generations. This approach can be adopted by litigants, judges, policy makers, scholars, and other
stakeholders. Bodies like the IUCN’s Global Judicial Institute on Environment (GJIE)669, which
comprises of judges from around the world, could play a vital role in integrating this perspective
into judicial decision-making system. Some of the key activities of the GJIE are information
exchange and sharing between judges, as well as education and training of judges.

7.2.5. Using the Child Rights Approach to advance Intergenerational Equity
The framework for protection of the rights of the child presents a framework that is easily
adaptable for protection of the rights of future generations, since children represent the bridge
between the present and future generations. The UN and States need to expand the frontiers of the
child rights to expressly cover the rights of future generations. It is equally important for climate
plaintiffs to adopt this approach as part of their litigation strategy while advancing the rights of
future generations and human rights arguments more broadly. This approach could address some
of the problems associated with protection of the rights of future generations.

669

The GJIE is a body under the auspices of the IUCN, UNEP, OAS, and other partners seeking “to develop and
enhance the capacity of judges, courts, and tribunals across the world to exercise their role in environmental matters
through the effective implementation, compliance, and enforcement of the law.” See IUCN, “Global Judicial
Institute on the Environment”, online: < https://www.iucn.org/commissions/world-commission-environmentallaw/our-work-wcel/global-judicial-institute-environment>.
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7.2.6. Rights’ Framing of Intergenerational Equity/Creation of rights for future
generations
The interests of future generations have to be framed using the language of rights, beyond
mere inclusion in preambular provisions of climate instrument as an aspirational principle and
beyond merely referencing the interests for explanatory purposes in climate cases. The framing of
the interests of future generations as rights creates a sense of responsibility and accountability on
duty-bearers to ensure that actions inimical to the rights of future generations are not taken. Human
rights have already been attributed to future generations within the legal regime of some States.
This can be replicated at international level as well as by other States. An important development
with respect to the interests of future generations at international level is the GPE. The GPE
provides that “intergenerational equity shall guide decisions that may have an impact on the
environment, [and that] present generations shall ensure that their decisions and actions do not
compromise the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.”670

7.2.7. Commencement of more Rights-based cases
There is no doubt that the rights-based approach to climate litigation is a recent
development. It is however important that the climate plaintiffs keep instituting these cases, as
these cases ensure that the jurisprudence of the human rights approach to climate litigation
continues to develop both at international level and domestic level. As seen in the course of this
thesis, the success and impact of these cases go beyond the outcomes in court. This is not to say
that the traditional forms of climate litigation should be abandoned, as the human rights approach

670
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cannot possibly address all the issues in climate change. It has to be employed alongside other
forms of climate litigation.

7.2.8. Human Rights Climate Cases against Private corporations
Plaintiffs need to consider commencing rights-based cases against private corporations
responsible for GHG emissions in addition to suing the government. Apart from the advantage of
not having the challenge of political question that plagues the cases against the States, the
possibility of getting sued could compel climate action by private actors. One of the major
challenges with instituting human rights-based climate cases against private corporations is the
challenge of proving violation and attribution of causation. The suggestion of Knox with respect
to addressing attribution of harm to respective states — allocation of responsibility according to
quantum of GHG emissions — could also be applied to hold private corporations accountable.
That is to say, private corporations could be held accountable for violation and threats to human
on the basis the quantum of GHG emissions. At international level, there is no binding instrument
that holds private corporations accountable for GHG emissions. It would therefore be challenging
to hold private entities accountable for climate-related human rights violations under the
international human rights framework. It is worthy of mention however that the draft GPE places
the duty to take care of the environment on not only States but “every… international institution,
every person, natural or legal, public or private.”671 Thus, the GPE if adopted will place a duty on
private entities to protect the environment.

671

Draft GPE, article 2.
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7.2.9. Human Rights Climate Litigation Stock-taking
It is important that climate scholars, lawyers, judges and other stakeholders in climate
litigation devise a means by which to determine the impact of the climate cases. This is important
in order to measure the progress of the human rights approach, especially against other forms of
climate litigation. In addition to the work being done by academics, organisations such as the
IUCN and the Sabin Center for Climate Law could potentially contribute by tracking the impacts
of judicial decisions on climate change. The major challenge to determining the impacts of these
cases remins the pervasiveness and remoteness of the impacts of the decisions.

7.3. Conclusion
The human rights approach and intergenerational equity approach to climate litigation has largely
changed the climate change discourse in a positive way and has the potential to do even more.
However, there are several setbacks that must be addressed for these perspectives to not only be
fully integrated into the climate change, but to effectively address climate change. The
intergenerational equity and human rights perspectives are complementary to each other, and ought
to be treated as such. These two perspectives hold a lot of promise towards addressing climate
change. It is therefore important that both approaches are properly harnessed to effectively address
climate change.
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